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Abstract
This thesis uses option-implied dividends to investigate research questions in three different areas
of finance: the ex-dividend day drop and related option pricing errors; insider trading on superior
dividend knowledge; and analyst dividend forecast accuracy, incorporation of market information,
and market response to analyst revisions.
The first chapter investigates market expectations of the ex-dividend stock price decline implied
by American options. Using a much larger set of option transactions than previous studies, I find
the ex-dividend drop-o implied by option prices is significantly less than the cash dividend. The
second focus of this study analyses factors that affect option pricing errors such as thin trading, non-
synchronous trading, and lower dividend yields. I also find an increase in option pricing errors for
deep in-the-money, deep out-of-the-money, and put-call pairs that cross the bid-ask spread.
The second chapter investigates, using a measure of dividends surprise calculated by put-call
parity, whether analysts update their forecasts in response to new market information, and likewise,
whether the market updates dividend expectations in response to analyst forecast revisions. I find that
only superior analysts respond to changes in market information and that the market does not respond
to changes in either non-superior or superior analyst forecast revisions. I also compare the accuracy of
forecasts and determine the order of increasing forecast precision as non-superior individual analysts,
superior individual analysts, option-implied, and consensus analyst forecasts.
The final chapter investigates whether insiders trade on their superior knowledge of future changes
in dividend policy. I use the difference between the dividend implied by option transaction prices
before and after the announcement as a proxy for dividend surprise. I find that CEOs are more likely to
accumulate stock preceding an announcement for an expected increase in the cash dividend. Whereas,
Non-director executives and Other Officers and block-holders are more likely to accumulate stock for
ii
iii
an unexpected increase. Directors were less likely to accumulate stock for an unexpected increase
and I attribute this to their presence on the firm board. I also find that Directors are more likely to
exercise their call options to acquire stock preceding an announcement for an expected increase in the
cash dividend. However, Directors and Other Officers and block-holders are less likely to exercise
their options for an unexpected increase in the cash dividend. The results are consistent with the
information hierarchy hypothesis.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Given perfect capital markets and symmetric information, Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that
corporate payout policy is irrelevant. But in the presence of taxes, transaction costs, and asymmetric
information, manager choice matters and dividends have both direct cash flow and signalling effects
for firms and investors (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985). Div-
idends are also important for stock valuation. Analysts forecast, and report to investors, future divi-
dends that are used by the analyst to forecast earnings, value the stock, and develop more profitable
buy-sell recommendations Barker (1999); Loh and Mian (2006).
In this thesis, I use option-implied dividends to investigate research questions in three different
areas of finance: the ex-dividend day drop and related option pricing errors; insider trading on superior
dividend knowledge; and analyst dividend forecast accuracy, incorporation of market information, and
market response to analyst revisions.
1
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Past studies have also used the expected dividends implied by option prices to investigate mar-
ket phenomena. Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1986) calculate the maximum likelihood estimates for
dividend and volatility using an option pricing model. Using another method, Bae-Yosef and Sarig
(1992) calculate expected dividends using put-call parity. Due to the current availability of a large set
of intraday option and stock transaction prices, I use the methodology from the later paper. The ad-
vantage of providing an ex-ante estimate of the dividend is that it is not confounded by economy-wide
and firm-specific information releases that may affect the stock price returns surrounding the ex-day.
This allows a calculation of the market expectation of the dividend using an empirical instrument that
more closely measures the theoretical concept of the dividend surprise.
This chapter provides an introduction and overview to the following three chapters of my doctoral
thesis. The first chapter investigates the relative ex-dividend day decline implied by the prices of
American options. The second chapter examines whether insiders trade when they have superior
knowledge of changes in dividend policy that are not priced by the market. And the third chapter
studies the accuracy of analyst dividend forecasts and the effect of forecast revisions on the change in
dividends implied by options and vice-versa.
1.2 Chapter I overview
In this chapter, I investigate the ex-dividend stock price decline implied by option transaction prices.
Determining the extent of the ex-day price decline is important for security pricing and understanding
the portfolio decisions of investors. Previous studies estimate the price decline by observing the
change in price from the day before the ex-day to either the opening or closing price on the ex-day. I
modify an approach, developed by Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992), that uses put-call parity to estimate
the expected dividend amount. The method I use in this chapter has the advantage of providing an ex-
ante estimate of the relative price decline. The only other study that has investigated the ex-day price
drop using options is Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1986). They do not find an ex-day price decline
that is significantly different from the amount of the dividend. I am able to re-examine this research
question using a substantially larger sample of option transaction data. The results are consistent with
an ex-dividend drop-off implied by option prices that is significantly less than the cash dividend.
The second purpose of this chapter is to investigate factors that contribute to option mispricing.
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Understanding factors that influence option pricing errors can help researchers and practitioners de-
velop sample filters that improve the accuracy of option prices used in implied volatility and risk
neutral probability models. I find an increase in pricing errors of the implied dividend with thin trad-
ing, non-synchronous trading, and lower dividend yields. I also find an increase in pricing errors for
deep in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money options and put-call pairs that are traded at opposing
bid and ask combinations.
1.3 Chapter II overview
The first chapter establishes a methodology for implying dividend expectations from option prices.
Changes in these expectations over time proxy for changes in the information available to the market
about the firm dividend policy. This chapter investigates the relationship between analyst dividend
forecasts and market expectations of dividends implied by option prices. My primary research ques-
tion is whether analysts update their forecasts in response to new market information, and likewise,
whether the market updates dividend expectations in response to analyst forecast revisions. Users
of analyst forecasts, such as investors, are interested in whether analysts, or a superior subset of an-
alysts, update their forecasts in response to new information. Market participants, such as option
traders, would also find it useful to know whether analyst dividend forecasts contain new information
that may affect market prices when announced. I answer this question by comparing individual ana-
lyst dividend forecasts with implied dividends from option prices as per the methodology in Guerrero
(2017), which is an extension of Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992).
The second focus of this chapter investigates whether option-implied, superior analysts, non-
superior, or consensus analysts provide more precise forecasts of firm dividends. Researchers can
better test dividend signalling theories, and value-relevancy of accounting measures, by calculating
a dividend surprise measure using a more precise forecast of market expectations of the dividend.
Analysts, investors, and industry can also calculate stock prices that are closer to fundamental value
when they use more precise dividend forecasts as inputs in their models.
The results show that dividends implied by option prices provide a more precise forecast of future
dividends than individual analyst and superior analyst forecasts but are not more accurate than the
mean consensus dividend forecast. Extending a concept in Baginski and Hassell (1990), that analysts
play a role in interpreting the quality of information produced by management revisions and other
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sources, I find evidence that superior analysts are more likely to update their dividend forecasts in
response to changes in the market information about the expected dividend. Non-superior analysts
are less likely to increase their forecasts in response to increases in the market expectations of the
dividend. The results indicate that analysts could use option-implied dividends to inform their own
dividend forecasts, increasing the accuracy of the dividend yield used as an input in their stock valu-
ation models. However, unlike previous studies1 that find a market response to earnings revisions, I
find no evidence for a option market response to analyst dividend forecast revisions.
1.4 Chapter III overview
This chapter applies the option-implied dividend methodology from the first chapter, to the question
of whether insiders trade stock or options using their superior knowledge, or control, of changes in
the amount of their firm’s dividend payments.
Past studies, such as Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988), investigate insider trading prior to div-
idend cessation or resumption and find that insiders trade and earn abnormal returns based on their
superior knowledge of dividend changes. I extend the naive model, that assumes any change in divi-
dend is a surprise to the market, by using the market expectations of dividends implied by option and
stock prices. As per the methodology in the previous chapter, I use the dividends implied by Amer-
ican options prices as a proxy for market expectations of dividends. I then use these expectations
to calculate a dividend surprise and investigate whether there is abnormal insider trading preceding
these dividend surprises. I also test for evidence of the information hierarchy2 or the alternative, the
scrutiny hypothesis3.
There are two advantages to my approach. First, past studies have included only firms that cease
or resume dividends4, however these firms are a very small subset of all dividend paying firms. Using
option-implied dividend changes I can include all dividend paying stocks with a liquid option market.
Second, we are interested in changes in the dividend amount that are unexpected by the market;
changes in the option-implied dividend provide a more accurate measure of dividend surprise than a
naive change5.
1(Gleason and Lee, 2003; Park and Stice, 2000)
2Seyhun (1986)
3Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006)
4Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988)
5Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992)
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I find that CEOs are more likely to accumulate stock preceding an announcement for an expected
increase in the cash dividend. Whereas, Non-board Executives and Other Officers and Block-holders
are more likely to accumulate stock for an unexpected increase. Directors were less likely to accu-
mulate stock for an unexpected increase and I attribute this to their presence on the firm board. The
results are consistent with the scrutinary hypothesis of past studies such as Fidrmuc et al. (2006).
I also find that CEOs and Other Officers and Block-holders are less likely to dispose of options
prior to an expected increase in dividends. Whereas, Directors are more likely to exercise their call
options preceding an announcement for an expected increase in the cash dividend. However, Direc-
tors and Other Officers and Block-holders are less likely to exercise their options for an unexpected
increase in the cash dividend. This result is consistent with the information hierarchy hypothesis put
forward by Seyhun (1986).
These findings will help firms develop appropriate corporate governance policies such as increas-
ing dividend policy transparency around announcement timing, as well as deciding when insiders
including non-directors are permitted to buy or sell stock in the company preceding a change in divi-
dends.
2
The Expected Ex-Dividend Stock Price Decline
Implied by Option and Stock Prices
2.1 Introduction
Since Campbell and Beranek (1955) discovered an ex-dividend stock price decline of less than the
amount of the cash dividend, many studies have investigated this phenomenon. Various studies,
discussed in detail later, have proposed different explanations for this observation including tax clien-
teles, arbitrage, price discreteness and microstructure effects. In addition, estimating the ex-day price
decline from observed stock price returns is difficult due to confounding information effects, changes
in trading volume around the ex-day, and the effect of the bid-ask spread. Determining the extent of
the ex-day price decline is important for security pricing, and understanding the portfolio decisions of
investors. In addition, understanding factors that influence option pricing errors can help researchers
and practitioners develop sample filters that improve the accuracy of option prices used in implied
6
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volatility and risk neutral probability models.
I use an approach, developed by Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992), that uses put-call parity of option
and stock transaction prices to estimate market expectations of the ex-dividend stock price decline.
Previous studies estimate the price decline by observing the change in price from the day before the
ex-day to either the opening or closing price on the ex-day. The method I use in this chapter has
the advantage of providing an ex-ante estimate of the relative price decline that is not confounded by
economy-wide and firm-specific information releases that may affect the stock price returns surround-
ing the ex-day. Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1986) is the only previous study to use option transaction
prices to estimate the ex-dividend stock price decline. Their results are consistent with some prior
studies, and do not find an ex-day price decline that is significantly different from the amount of the
dividend. I am able to re-examine this research question using a substantially larger sample, of option
transaction data, than was available previously.
The results are consistent with an ex-dividend drop-off implied by option prices that is signif-
icantly less than the cash dividend. I also investigate factors that have an effect on option prices
and find an increase in pricing errors with thin trading, non-synchronous trading, and lower dividend
yields. I also find an increase in pricing errors for deep in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money
options and put-call pairs that are traded at opposing bid and ask combinations.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of the theoretical and empirical
literature on the ex-day relative price decline. The section is divided into the various explanations
hypothesised for the decline. Section 3 outlines the method of estimating the relative ex-dividend
stock price decline from American option transaction prices, and the various tests used to test its
economic significance. Section 4 presents the results, analysis and discussion. Section 5 summarizes
the chapter and provides directions for future research.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Estimations of the ex-day price decline
Early studies on the ex-day stock price decline observe prices surrounding the ex-day and provide de-
scriptive statistics on the extent of the decline for different types of stock distributions during different
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periods. Typically the measure is calculated as:
SB − SA
D
(2.1)
where SB is the stock price at the close of trading the day before the ex-day, and SA is the stock price
at the opening or the close on the ex-day, depending on the paper.
The first study to analyse the ex-dividend drop off value is Campbell and Beranek (1955). Using
399 observations from October 1949 and April 1950, and the last three months of 1953, they calculate
the arithmetic mean of drop-off percentages and find the average is approximately 90%. They raise
the prospect that the ex-dividend stock price decline should differ depending on the income tax rate
of the recipient of the dividend.
In contrast to the above study, Barker (1959) uses stock-dividends, which, unlike cash-dividends,
are not taxed as ordinary income. He includes observations of stock-dividends of 5% or more, to
reduce the effect of one-eighth rounding of share prices imposed by the exchange, and observes 224
issues by NYSE-listed companies during the years 1951 to 1954. He finds the average market price
drop-off was 97.4% of the dilution price decline calculated based on the prior-day closing price; the
median was 100.0%. This result suggests that the average decline of less than the amount of the
dividend, as per Campbell and Beranek (1955), is possibly due to the difference in taxation between
cash-dividends and stock-dividends.
Later studies, such as Durand and May (1960), further investigate the ex-day relative price decline
using different methodologies that attempt to remove confounding effects on the price movement
around the ex-day. Unlike prior studies that use a panel of stocks, they observe a single stock, AT&T,
for 45 consecutive dividends between 1948 and 1959. They use a time series analysis to attempt
to remove general market trends surrounding the ex-dividend date. Due to the time series nature
of the study, the paper measures the stock price decline from closing price the day before to the
closing price on the ex-day, as opposed the closing price to opening price measure used in Campbell
and Beranek (1955). Despite variation of stock price decline, they find that the drop-off is on average
approximately equal to the dividend. These results do not support the decline of less than the dividend
amount from the results of Campbell and Beranek (1955) and prompted further research.
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2.2.2 Tax clientele effect
The presence of differential taxation between different types of stockholders may induce a tax clien-
tele effect. Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggest that firms tend to attract a clientele of investors
who prefer its particular payout ratio. Investors with a lower income tax rate on dividends such as
corporations and pension funds may prefer higher yield stocks. Whereas, other investors with higher
income tax rates on dividend distributions prefer to own low yield stocks with higher capital growth.
In order to determine whether a tax clientele effect exists, it is necessary to know the tax rates of
marginal stockholders. Elton and Gruber (1970) present a method for inferring the marginal stock-
holder tax rate using observed ex-dividend price changes. They show that, in the absence of transac-
tion costs, the ex-dividend stock price decline should accord with the following equation:
SB − SA
D
=
1− to
1− tg (2.2)
where SB is the stock price just before the stock goes ex-dividend and SA is the stock price just after,
to is the ordinary income tax rate and tg is the capital gains tax rate. From this equation I can see that
when the capital gains rate is less than the ordinary tax rate, the value of the decline should be less
than one.
They use the relationship in equation (2.2) to estimate the marginal stockholder for NYSE-listed
stocks that paid a dividend between April 1966 and March 1967. They attempt to isolate the ex-day
price changes from the broader market by adjusting the price change by the change in the NYSE
index. They find that the relative decline is significantly less than the amount of the dividend at the
1% level, and that the average inferred marginal tax rate is 35.1%.
They also construct two variables to test Miller and Modigliani (1961)’s proposed clientele effect:
dividend yield and payout ratio. Using deciles of dividend yield, they find a negative relationship
between the dividend yield and the marginal tax bracket.1 They also find that the implied stockholder
tax rate declines with an increase in the firm’s payout ratio decile.2 Both these results support the
hypothesis that stockholders with higher marginal tax rates prefer lower current dividends and a higher
proportion of capital growth via a lower payout ratio.
As I noted earlier, Barker (1959) use a method for revealing differences in the ex-day price decline
1Spearman rank correlation of 0.9152 and significant at the 1% level.
2Spearman rank correlation of 0.7939 and significant at the 1% level.
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due to taxation by observing stocks with different tax treatments on their distributions. Using this
approach, Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) observe the ex-day returns around common stock taxable
distributions, preferred stock distributions, and non-taxable distributions. Their sample includes all
stock dividends of 5% or more issued on the NYSE from 1951 to 1954. They find the returns on stock
with taxable dividends are consistent with the hypothesis that dividend income is taxed at a higher
rate than capital gains. In contrast, the high yield preferred stock has a decline that is greater than the
amount of the dividend. This can occur when a marginal stockholder has a capital gains tax rate that
is greater than their income tax rate on dividends. This result supports the tax clientele hypothesis and
indicates that preferred stock are owned by corporations, which receive an 85% reduction on income
received as dividends. They also find that non-taxable cash distributions are priced as if investors
receive a tax rebate; possibly due to investor preference of non-taxable distributions over realising a
capital gain on the sale of the stock.
A recent study that investigates distributions that are subject to different taxation is Elton, Gru-
ber, and Blake (2005). They examine dividends from closed-end funds with taxable and non-taxable
distributions. As both funds are subject to capital gains tax, the difference in price drop from distri-
butions is only due to taxation. They find that funds with non-taxable distributions decline by more
than the amount of the distribution; this is consistent with the tax hypothesis and does not support
the microstructure hypothesis discussed later. However, short selling restrictions on closed-end funds
may produce results that are different to common stocks that are subject to tax-induced short term
trading and arbitrage.
2.2.3 Tax-induced short term trading and arbitrage
Kalay (1982) shows that due to arbitrage, the ex-dividend relative decline is bounded. If the dividend
per share is smaller than the expected price drop then an investor could sell a stock short cum-dividend
and buy it back ex-dividend, where the profit on the trade is
(1− τ0)[PB − P¯A −D − αP¯ ] > 0 (2.3)
where αP¯ is the expected transaction costs of a round trip. Alternatively, if the dividend per share
is greater than the expected price drop then an investor could buy the stock cum-dividend and sell it
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ex-dividend, where the profit on the trade is
(1− τ0)[D − (PB − P¯A)− αP¯ ] > 0. (2.4)
Combining the two equations and rearranging, he derives a range for the drop-off ratios:
1− αP¯
D
≤ PB − P¯A
D
≤ 1 + αP¯
D
(2.5)
Therefore, the range of the ex-dividend relative decline is inversely proportional to the dividend yield.
The tax rates of the firm’s stockholders can only be inferred if the values imply a value within this
range. He also shows that the ex-dividend price drop is biased downward by r¯PB/D, where r¯ is the
expected daily rate of return of the stock. Later papers augment their models to control for this effect.
Eades et al. (1984) also supports the hypothesis that a reduction in transaction costs decreases
the relative ex-day price decline. They were able to find a decline of less than the dividend amount
for taxable distributions from 1962 until the introduction of negotiated commissions in 1975. How-
ever, they were unable to find a tax premium between 1975 and 1980 when transaction costs were
significantly lower.
In contrast to previous studies, that use stock price changes around the ex-day, Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986) investigate trading volume changes to determine whether there is a short term
trading effect. The tax clientele hypothesis assumes that prices are set by investors who decide to buy
or sell around the ex-day for reasons unrelated to the dividend. Investors choose, depending on their
tax position, between bringing their trade forward prior to the ex-day or delaying their trade until after
the ex-day. The combined volume of trade before and after the ex-day should not increase due to tax
clienteles.
However, there are other reasons that investors might trade around the ex-day. Investors with a
high income tax rate may sell the stock before and buy the stock back after the ex-day, paying tax on
a capital gain rather than dividend income. In addition, other investors with lower taxes on dividends
such as corporations may be induced to purchase the stock immediately before the ex-day and sell
after, capturing the dividend. Investors trading for these purposes will cause an abnormal increase
in trading volume around the ex-day; and this is evident in the empirical results of Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986). They find that taxable distributions of cash dividends induces a significant increase
in trading volume around the ex-day. The increase is more pronounced for high yield stocks and low
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transaction cost stocks. These results are consistent with arbitrage trading. They find that non-taxable
distributions such as stock splits and stock dividends have a negative abnormal volume around the
ex-day.
As opposed to previous studies that segmented the sample into pre and post negotiated commis-
sions, Karpoff and Walkling (1990) observe a more direct proxy for transaction costs. They use a
one-factor market model to adjust ex-day price declines and the average bid-ask spread over a 30-day
period to proxy transaction costs. They find a positive relationship between transaction costs and ex-
day returns, which support the hypothesis that a reduction in transaction costs increases tax-induced
trading and arbitrage.
Additional support for tax-induced trading and arbitrage comes from Koski and Scruggs (1998).
They use NYSE audit file data to determine whether the abnormal trading volume observed by Lakon-
ishok and Vermaelen (1986) is due to security dealers or corporations. They find significant abnormal
trading volume by securities dealers that is positively related to dividend yield and negatively related
to transaction costs. In addition, they find some evidence of dividend capture by taxable corporations
and insufficient evidence to support the tax-clientele hypothesis.
2.2.4 Equilibrium pricing tests
Another approach for determining whether the taxation of dividends increases the return required by
investors is to use an equilibrium pricing model. Black and Scholes (1974) test whether the expected
returns on high yield stocks are higher than the expected returns on low yield stocks due to differential
taxation of dividend verses capital gain. They find that a dividend factor in an augmented CAPM
model is insignificant, and conclude that investors do not expect a higher return due to taxation.
A similar method is used by Miller and Scholes (1982) to test for the presence of a difference
in expected returns based on dividend yield. In contrast to previous studies, they attempt to adjust
their sample selection based on the information available to investors ex-ante. They only include
observations of the ex-month for stocks that announced dividends prior to, rather than during, the
ex-month. They find a smaller coefficient for stocks prior to the ex-month than during the ex-month
and attribute this to a dividend announcement information effect.
However, as subsequently pointed out by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982), the average num-
ber of days from the beginning of an ex-month to the ex-date is greater for stocks that announce
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within the ex-month than for stocks that announce prior to the ex-month. If the information effect
occurs over a period of weeks,3 then this will change the relative returns for the two different pools of
stocks. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) investigate the expected return of portfolios based on
yield, using information investors have ex-ante. They find a non-linear relationship between dividend
yield and and common stock returns but caution that this relationship may be due to omitted variables.
Michaely and Vila (1995) use an equilibrium model to explain trading volume and stock price
behaviour around ex-dividend days. They show that the ex-day price decline relative to the dividend
is a function of two variables: the average relative tax rate of dividend and capital gains across traders,
weighted by their risk tolerance; and the risk due to uncertainty about the ex-day price returns and the
risk-premium demanded by traders. This premium may obscure inferences of the marginal tax rate of
any trading group and can result in the ex-day price decline of less than the dividend amount even in
the absence of transaction costs. They find empirical support for two predictions of their model. First,
that increased stock variance decreases the trading volume around the ex-day. Second, after the 1986
tax reform, which increased tax homogeneity among investor groups, trading volume around ex-days
decreased.
2.2.5 Microstructure effects
Price discreteness is another proposed explanation for ex-day price declines of less than the amount of
the dividend. Bali and Hite (1998) argue that because ex-day stock prices can only be adjusted down
in multiples of the tick size, if the dividend amount is not a multiple of the tick size then the ex-day
price will be rounded to the nearest tick. During the period from their sample, the minimum tick size
was 12.5¢ and the median cash dividend was 20¢. Using these values as an example produces in a ex-
day price decline of 62.5% of the dividend amount. Their empirical results support the discreteness
hypothesis just as well as the tax clientele model. However, evidence of the ex-day price decline of
greater than the amount of the dividend for non-taxable cash distributions cannot be explained by
discreteness and therefore supports the existence of the tax clientele effect.4
Another way to determine whether the ex-day decline of less than one is due to microstructure
effects or taxes is to examine a market where there are no taxes. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) study
ex-day price declines in the Hong Kong market from 1980 to 1993 during which there was no tax on
3Black and Scholes (1974) find abnormal returns for several days surrounding the ex-dividend date
4Eades et al. (1984); Elton et al. (2005)
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dividends or capital gains. They find an ex-day price drop of less than the price of the dividend and
propose a microstructure explanation. However, they don’t consider the effect of taxation on foreign
sourced income. Foreign investors own a large proportion of Hong Kong companies and pay income
tax on the repatriated income. The foreign tax effect combined with short selling restrictions for the
Hong Kong Market during the sample period, which limit the ability to arbitrage, may explain the
relative price drop of less than one.
2.2.6 Motivation
Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1986) use American call option transaction prices to estimate the ex-day
relative price decline. Their method has the advantage of providing an ex-ante estimate of the relative
price decline that is not confounded by economy-wide and firm-specific information releases that may
affect the stock price returns surrounding the ex-day. Consistent with some prior studies, their results
do not support an ex-day price decline that is significantly different from the amount of the dividend.
An alternative explanation for their result is that their sample selection increased the variance
of the estimate of the relative ex-dividend stock price decline and possibly upwardly biased their
estimate. Option traders have a variance for their estimate of the dividend before the announcement.
After the announcement, the dividend is known but the relative ex-day stock price decline is still
uncertain. Therefore, the variation of the ex-day price decline implied in option transaction prices
will be greater before the announcement than after. In addition, if option traders are risk-averse, they
will require a risk-premium for the additional uncertainty of pricing the ex-day price decline, as an
input in their option prices, before the dividend is certain. This risk-premium is modelled with stock
prices by Michaely and Vila (1995), and should be incorporated in option prices. The premium will
upwardly bias an estimate of the relative price decline to a greater extent if pre-announcement option
transactions are included in an estimation compared with post-announcement. Barone-Adesi and
Whaley (1986) include option transactions prior to announcement. Option transactions with less than
4 weeks to expiration account for approximately 4.65% of the observations in their study. However,
given the sample period, restricting their sample to option transactions after dividend announcements
would provide insufficient power given their sample size. Since their paper was published, option
markets have become more liquid and the number of transactions available to use in a study has
substantially increased. This provides us with the opportunity to re-examine the issue and ask two
questions. First, are dividends implied by option prices accurate forecasts for the cash dividend? And
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second, following a dividend announcement, do option traders price an ex-day stock decline of less
than the amount of the cash dividend?
2.2.7 Summary of the literature
Studies that observe the price change around the ex-day find a relative price decline of less than the
dividend amount.5 A tax clientele effect has been proposed as the primary determinant of the decline,
and many papers find evidence to support this effect.6 Although early papers proposed that the tax
rates of the marginal investor could be inferred from the ex-day decline, more recent papers propose
tax-induced short term trading and arbitrage as additional effects. There is theoretical and empirical
support for both these effects.7 However, many studies find no support for an ex-day decline greater
than the dividend.8 And some studies propose that microstructure and discreteness effects are partially
or wholly responsible for the observed price changes.9 Importantly, there is no evidence that the ex-
day decline of less than the dividend amount is factored into the option prices on dividend paying
stock.10 The question of whether the ex-day relative decline is priced by option traders is the primary
goal of this chapter.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Estimation of the implied dividends from option prices
I follow a similar methodology to (Bae-Yosef and Sarig, 1992), who use option put-call parity to
estimate changes in dividend expectations as a proxy for dividend surprise. The following equation
holds for European options:
PV (DIV ) = S − (c− p+KBt) (2.6)
where PV (DIV ) is the current value of expected interim dividends; S, c, and p are the prices of the
underlying stock, the European call, and the European put, respectively; K is the common exercise
5(Campbell and Beranek, 1955; Elton and Gruber, 1970)
6(Barker, 1959; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Eades et al., 1984; Elton et al., 2005; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982).
7(Kalay, 1982; Eades et al., 1984; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Karpoff and Walkling, 1990; Koski and Scruggs,
1998; Michaely and Vila, 1995).
8Durand and May (1960); Black and Scholes (1974); Miller and Scholes (1982).
9(Bali and Hite, 1998; Frank and Jagannathan, 1998)
10(Barone-Adesi and Whaley, 1986)
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price; and Bt is the time-t price of a pure discount bond maturing on the options’ common expiration
day.
Equation 4.1 is based on European option prices. Since I can only observe American options, I
need to take into account the premium due to the right of early exercise. I define the American over
European option premium, for calls and puts, by:
∆c ≡ C − c ≥ 0 (2.7)
∆p ≡ P − p ≥ 0 (2.8)
where C and P are American call and put prices, respectively. Equation 4.1 can now be written as
PV (DIV ) = S − (c+ ∆c− (p+ ∆p) +KBt) (2.9)
American options will not be exercised early, and therefore have an equivalent price to European
options, whenever:
D ≤ K(1− e−R(T−t)) (2.10)
where D is the dividend, R is the forward rate between the dividend payout time, t, and the expiration
date, T, as observed at time t, and K is the exercise price of the option.
The estimation procedure matches the two closest observations, based on time, where a put and
call with the same exercise price and expiration date occur on the same day. Transactions are only
matched to a single pair but there may exist many pairs on any given day. I find 80,898 put-call
trade pairs, approximately 8.37% of the final sample, meet the condition in equation 4.5 and I use a
modified equation 4.1 to calculate the future value of the dividend, for these transactions:
IDIV =
(
S − C + P −K exp (−R(TM − t))) exp (R(TX − t)) (2.11)
where IDIV is the future value, at the ex-dividend day TX , of the cash dividend, C, P , K are the
call, put, and strike prices, S is the mean of stock trade prices that occur between the put-call pair,
TM is the time of maturity, and R is the forward rate.
American call options that do not meet the condition in equation 4.5 will be exercised the day
before the ex-dividend date due to the expected stock price decline. Whereas, American put options
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that do not meet the the condition in 4.5 will be exercised on or after the ex-dividend date depending
on moneyness. If the interest on the proceeds from early exercise exceed the time value of money
then early exercise is optimal:
(K − S)(1− e−R(T−t)) > T.V. (2.12)
where T.V. is the time value of the option, and the remaining notation is the same as equation 4.5.
Based on the expected price decline due to the dividend, I anticipate an insignificant marginal dif-
ference in the European vs American put option premium.1112 Therefore, for the main study, the
remaining option pairs that do not satisfy equation 4.5 are estimated using equation 4.6 with the
maturity date TM set to the ex-dividend date TX due to early exercise.
2.3.2 Data
The data in the study are compiled from two sources: OptionMetrics and ThomsonReuters Tick
History. I analyse data from years 2009 to 2015. The option tick data provided by ThomsonReuters
does not exist prior to 2009, so I am unable to analyse the effect of bear markets and the Global
Financial Crisis on the option market expectations of the dividend. However, this is unlikely to have a
significant effect given that the options price dividends that are typically less than a financial quarter
before the ex-dividend date. Using end-of-day data and dividend event data from OptionMetrics, I
compile a list of firm-years that match the following filter: at least a single daily traded volume of 30
for an option instrument with a single ex-dividend date between the trade date and option maturity.
Using these firm-years, I collect all option and underlying stock tick data from ThomsonReuters Tick
History from 2009-2015. The final sample consists of 9,334 firm-years from 1,908 firms.
I exclude dividend events where the stock price moves more than 10% from the close the day
before the ex-dividend date to the opening on the ex-dividend date. I exclude, due to the unavailability
of future dividend event information, option maturities with expiration past the dividend event sample
period of 31st December 2015. I exclude estimated dividend yields greater than 10%. This reduces
the sample approximately 0.01% from 4,818,361 to 4,817,818 individual estimates.
I truncate at the 2nd and 98th percentiles for the individual dividend estimates, implied alpha ,
11Gray (1989) finds in favour of put-call parity holding when taking into account the potential rational early exercise
of an option and the possibility that dividends and capitalisation changes will differ from expectations.
12Whaley (1982) finds only a half-percent difference in pricing between European and American options.
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and overnight realized alpha. This reduces the final sample by approximately 10.6% to 4,303,528
individual estimates. I then calculate the mean of the individual estimates for each dividend event and
use these values in the following analysis.
[Descriptive statistics table 1 about here]
2.3.3 Estimation of the implied and realized ex-dividend stock price decline
The observed stock returns surrounding the ex-dividend date are noisy due to confounding factors
such as idiosyncratic and systematic price effects. I investigate three different measures of the ex-
dividend stock price decline to determine the best measure to compare the relationship between
αrealized and the αimplied by the option implied dividend estimates. The first measure I use is the
Overnight Stock Price Drop:
DROPovernight = SB − SO (2.13)
where SB is the stock price at the close of trading the day before the ex-day, and SO is the stock price
at the opening on the ex-day. The second measure I use is the Daily Stock Price Drop:
DROPdaily = SB − SA (2.14)
where SB is the stock price at the close of trading the day before the ex-day, and SA is the stock price
at the close on the ex-day. The third measure I use is the Daily Stock Price Drop adjusted for market
movements. I adjust the ex-dividend day stock price return using the market model:
E(ri|rmt) = αi + βirmt (2.15)
where rm is the S&P 1500 Stock index, αi and βi are estimated from sample return data prior to the
ex-dividend date. Subtracting E(ri) from 2.14 gives a market adjusted measure of the ex-dividend
day drop:
DROPadjusted = Si,B(E(ri)− ri,realized) (2.16)
where Si,B is the close price the day before ex-dividend day, for stock i, ri, realized is the close to
close daily stock return for stock i.
[Results table 2 about here]
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The overnight drop model has significantly more explanatory power for explaining the effect of
the cash dividend around the ex-dividend date. Therefore, I define the realized ex-dividend stock
price decline as:
αrealized =
SB − SO
D
(2.17)
where αrealized is the relative ex-dividend stock price decline, SB is the closing stock price the day
before the ex-dividend date, SO is the opening stock price on the ex-dividend date, and D is the
realized cash dividend amount. Likewise, I define a measure of expected stock price decline implied
by option prices as:
αimplied =
IDIV
D
(2.18)
where αimplied is the option implied relative ex-dividend stock price decline, IDIV is the dividend
amount implied by option prices from 4.6, and D is the realized cash dividend amount.
2.3.4 Pricing error factors
I calculate the expected ex-dividend drop using put-call parity from options and stock prices after the
dividend announcement. Because the cash dividend is known, the only variation in the implied drop
must come from either heterogeneous expectations among the option traders or empirical effects such
as the bid-ask spread. In this section, I test five factors that have an effect on the error in the implied
ex-dividend drop. First, I calculate the relative difference between the implied ex-dividend drop and
the cash dividend for each individual put-call pair as,
δj =
IDIVji −Di
Di
(2.19)
where IDIVj is the individual implied ex-dividend drop for put-call pair j for dividend event i cal-
culated using equation 4.1. I then calculate the standard deviation of δj for each dividend event to
measure the amount of variation between the individual ex-dividend drop estimates for each dividend
event. I define pricing Errors as,
si =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
j=1
(δj − δ¯j)2 (2.20)
where N is the number of implied dividend estimates for dividend event i.
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In the following analysis, dividend events are sorted into factor-based deciles. The mean, median,
and standard deviation for each decile is calculated from the pricing errors. The difference between
the means of each decile reveals whether the pricing error changes with the factor. Whereas, the
difference between the standard deviation of each decile indicates a change in the amount of variation
in the error between dividend events based on changes in the pricing factor. Later in the analysis, I
use filters to create a subsample with a reduced pricing error. It is important to use the factors that
decrease the mean error of the sample but also reduce the variation across dividend events in order
improve the estimation of the implied ex-dividend drop.
I test for the equality of means of the pricing error across deciles using the GLM F-statistic devel-
oped by (Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972).
If equality is rejected then I use the Jonckheere-Terpstra trend in group medians test developed by
Jonckheere (1954); Terpstra (1952). I test the following hypothesis,
H0 : θ1 = θ2 = ... = θ10 (2.21)
HA : θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θ10, with at least one strict inequality. (2.22)
where θi is the median value of the pricing error of the ith decile. The test z-statistic is calculated
using the method described in Jonckheere (1954),
piaijaj =
1, if Xiai < Xjaj .0, otherwise. (2.23)
where Xiai is the ath value in the ith sample drawn from k samples of size m, i = 1, . . . , k − 1; j =
1 + i; ai = 1, . . . ,mi; aj = 1, . . . ,mj .
pij =
mi∑
ai=1
mj∑
aj=1
piaijaj (2.24)
S = 2
k−1∑
t=1
k∑
j=1+i
pij −
k−1∑
t=1
k∑
j=1+i
mimj (2.25)
V AR(S) =
2(n3 −∑ t3i ) + 3(n2 −∑ t2i )
18
(2.26)
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where n is the total number of scores, and ti is the number of scores in the ith sample.
z =
Sc√
V AR(S)
(2.27)
where Sc is a continuity correction Sc = |S| − 1.
Likewise, I test for a trend in the variances of the deciles to determine whether the factor increases
or decreases the variability of the error between dividend events. Levene et al. (1960) derives a test for
the homogeneity of variance of group observations. This was adapted by Brown and Forsythe (1974)
who demonstrated that using medians rather than the means, when calculating the spread between the
groups, is more robust to non-normal data whilst retaining good statistical power. Gastwirth, Gel, and
Miao (2009) extended these tests to include rank linear trends in the group variances. I test the null
hypothesis that the standard deviations of the pricing error are all equal,
H0 : σ1 = σ2 = . . . = σ10 (2.28)
HA : σ1 < σ2 < . . . < σ10 (2.29)
with the alternative hypothesis that the standard deviations of the deciles are strictly ordered. I calcu-
late the Modified Brown-Forsythe Levene-type test statistic as,
βˆ =
∑k
i=1 ni(wi − w˜)(z˜i. − z˜..)∑k
i=1 ni(wi − w˜)2
(2.30)
w¯ =
k∑
i=1
niwi
Ni
(2.31)
where z˜i., i = 1, . . . , k, are the group medians of zij and z˜.. is the grand median over z¯..,i = 1, . . . , k.
The following results are robust to substituting the means z¯ where the medians z˜ are used in equation
2.30; as per the original Levene test.
2.4 Results
The first few sections of results present the estimates for pricing error factors. As discussed previously,
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2.4.1 Volume of option trades
The individual estimates, calculated from each pair of put-call trades, are averaged to produce an ag-
gregate ex-dividend day decline estimate for each dividend event. The number of individual estimates
used for each aggregated estimate depends on the volume of both put and call option trades between
the dividend announcement and the ex-dividend date. Options on thinly traded stocks are more dif-
ficult to arbitrage and therefore, possibly, have option prices that deviate from those expected from
put-call parity. I hypothesise that firms with a lower volume of option trades will have a larger mean
pricing error and more variation across events than firms with higher volumes of option trades.
[Results table 3 about here]
Results from Table 3 reject the null hypothesis for an equality of means (F -statistic 51.42), me-
dians (Z-statistic -11.5318), and variances (βˆ 101.33) in favour of the alternatives that there is a
decreasing trend in the median and standard deviation of the pricing errors based on decile of option
volume.
2.4.2 Moneyness of the put-call options
I hypothesize that deep in-the-money options have an larger pricing error because of a divergence
in optimal exercise time between calls and puts. Deep in-the-money call options are more likely to
be exercised prior to the ex-dividend date, when the stock is expected to fall by the amount of the
dividend. Whereas, a put option with the same strike will be deep out-of-the-money and exercise will
be delayed until much closer to option expiry.
[Results table 4 about here]
The mean, median, and standard deviation from Table 4 are high at low S/X ratios then low near
the money then high again at high S/X ratios. The upside down umbrella, Figure 2.1, means that
the monotonic trend tests I used previously are not applicable for testing a trend in the moneyness
factor. Mack and Wolfe (1981) develop a test for umbrella alternatives with a known peak. However,
the lowest mean and median error is unknown and could likely be either 0.95 ≤ S/X ≤ 1 or 1 ≤
S/X ≤ 1.05. Chen and Wolfe (1990) modify the test to remove the assumption that the underlying
populations have the same shape and provide a test statistic for an unknown-peak in the umbrella.
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FIGURE 2.1: Pricing error by the degree to which the options are in-the-money.
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I test can use the Mack-Wolfe-Chen Test by taking the reciprocal of the pricing error to invert the
shape. I then test the following hypothesis,
H0 : θ1 = θ2 = ... = θk (2.32)
HA : θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θp ≥ . . . ≥ θk, for some p, with at least one strict inequality. (2.33)
where θk is the median of the reciprocal of the pricing error. The reciprocal is taken to transform the
data to fit the umbrella alternative.
Results from Table 4 reject the null hypothesis for an equality of median errors (A∗pˆ 39.067) in
favour of the alternative that there is an umbrella trend in the median based on the moneyness of
the options. The estimated peak group, for lowest median error, is near-the-money between 0.95 ≤
S/X ≤ 1.
The distribution of option moneyness from Table 1 shows that deep out-of-the-money and deep
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in-the-money options have much lower traded volume than near-the-money, at-the-money, and in-
the-money options. The results in the previous section, Table 3, show a monotonic trend in pricing
error with the volume of individual options per dividend event. In order to rule out option traded
volume, as the confounding factor for the above moneyness results, I construct a subsample with a
uniform volume across all moneyness group. The sample is constructed by taking the 2nd to the 11th
moneyness groups. This is group 0.8 ≤ S/X ≤ 0.85 through to 1.3 ≤ S/X ≤ 1.35. Additionally,
I only use volume deciles 1 to 6 from Table 3. I then select 55 random observations from each
moneyness group which results in a total of 3,300 dividend events with a uniform distribution of
volume. The results in Table 5 are very similar to the full sample. The Mack-Wolfe-Chen statistic is
slightly lower at 11.433 but is still significant at the 0.001 level. The estimated lowest median pricing
error has moved from near-the-money, 0.95 ≤ S/X ≤ 1, to at-the-money, 1 ≤ S/X ≤ 1.05. The
results confirm the effect of the inverted umbrella on the option dividend pricing error.
2.4.3 Non-synchronous trading
Put-call parity relies on tradable prices. As the time between the put and call options increase, the
price of the underlying stock and the factors that affect the price the option premiums may diverge
from the values when the first option was traded. I hypothesize that put-call pairs matched closer in
time have a lower pricing error because of reduced non-synchronous trading effects.
[Results table 6 about here]
Results from Table 6 reject the null hypothesis for an equality of means (F -statistic 1186.43),
medians (Z-statistic 109.0832), and variances (βˆ -91.151) in favour of the alternatives that there is
an increasing trend in the median and standard deviation of the pricing errors based on decile of time
between put-call option pairs.
2.4.4 Put call spread
Suppose a trader were to arbitrage option mispricing using put-call parity. The trader would either buy
the stock plus the put and sell the call, otherwise they could sell the stock plus the put and buy the call.
Therefore, it is plausible that the combination of put-call bid-ask that would exhibit the largest pricing
errors would follow this alternate bid-ask combination. An alternative hypothesis is that traders who
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arbitrage put-call parity are market makers and do not cross the spread. This would result in same-
side bid-bid and ask-ask combinations with the largest pricing errors because they would include an
inventory holding premium.
[Results table 7 about here]
Results from Table 7 reject the null hypothesis for an equality of means for the put-call bid-ask
combinations as a group (F -statistic 17.94). Tukey’s Studentized Range Test shows that two com-
binations have higher errors than Call-Ask Put-Ask than other combinations at the 0.05 significance
level. These two combinations are Call-Ask Put-Bid at 0.023639 higher and Call-Bid Put-Bid which is
0.018259 higher. Call-Bid Put-Bid has a significantly lower error than Call-Ask Put-Bid by 0.017378
and Call-Bid Put-Ask by 0.011998. There is no significant difference between Call-Bid Put-Bid and
Call-Ask Put-Ask or between Call-Ask Put-Bid and Call-Bid Put-Ask. These results show that the
lowest errors occur when both call and put trades are on the same side either the bid or the ask. If
the call and put trade occurs at Bid and the Ask then the error is higher and there is no significant
difference whether it is the call or the put on one-side or the other.
2.4.5 Dividend yield
As discussed previously, variation in the relative ex-dividend day decline are possibly due to costs
and limits of arbitrage.13 As such, I hypothesize that the pricing error will be lower for high yield
stocks due to transaction costs making up a smaller proportion of the dividend and therefore potential
arbitrage profits.
[Results table 8 about here]
Results from Table 8 reject the null hypothesis for an equality of means (F -statistic 845.45),
medians (Z-statistic -78.5589), and variances (βˆ 46.316) in favour of the alternatives that there is a
decreasing trend in the median and standard deviation of the pricing errors based on dividend yield.
2.4.6 Comparison of implied alpha and realized alpha
I filter below the median for all factors that were identified, in the previous sections, to increase
the error in the implied dividend. I include options that are below the median yield of 0.00621,
13(Kalay, 1982; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986)
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and I include estimates where the time between matched put-call pairs is less than 14 minutes. The
moneyness of the filtered sample is limited to 0.9 ≥ S/X ≤ 1.1. And the bid-ask of the filtered
sample were also limited to Call-Ask Put-Ask or Call-Bid Put-Bid combinations.
This reduces the sample of dividend events from 17,818 to 4,943. I do not filter based on the
volume of individual estimates used for each dividend event as this factor has a much smaller effect
than the other factors and filtering below the median would exclude 78% of the remaining sample
leaving only 1,048 dividend events.
[Descriptive statistics table 9 about here]
It is not surprising that the standard deviation for all observations of the Overnight Alpha (1.88124)
is much larger than the standard deviation of the Implied Alpha (0.37995). This is likely due to the
confounding factors such as overnight information releases that affect the change in the overnight
price and add noise to the observed price change. Whereas, the implied alpha is an ex-ante measure
implied from option prices made days or weeks earlier that are not affected by information released
after the close of trading the day before the ex-dividend date.
The filtering factors that lower the standard error of the Implied Alpha from 0.37995 to 0.31385
also have an effect on the Overnight Alpha reducing the error from 1.88124 to 0.94456. The mean
Overnight Alpha increase when filtered from 0.763177 to 0.815024 whereas the Implied Alpha de-
creases due to the filtering from 0.894496 to 0.842144.
2.4.7 Predictive ability of alpha implied by option prices
I can test whether the estimates of implied α are able to predict the subsequently realized values of
relative stock price decline. This gives us an indication of whether the implied α are economically
meaningful.
The estimate of the realized value of α for individual firms is computed as (SB − SA)/D, where
SB is the closing stock price on the day before ex-dividend, SA is the opening stock price on the day
of ex-dividend, and D is the amount of the dividend. I calculate the Mean Absolute Predictive Error
as,
MAPE =
1
n
n∑
j=1
|Aj − Pj| (2.34)
where Aj is the realized stock price decline estimate for the jth stock, Pj is the predicted stock price
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decline estimate for the jth stock, and n is the number of observations for the year. And I calculate
the Mean Squared Predictive Error as,
MSPE =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(Aj − Pj)2. (2.35)
[Results table 3.3 about here]
I can test whether option traders can predict firm variation in the ex-dividend drop by regressing
the option implied alpha on the realized alpha, that is,
αˆrealized,j = γ0 + γ1αˆimplied,j + j (2.36)
If the estimated coefficients γˆ0 and γˆ1 are indistinguishable from zero and one, respectively, then
the αimplied is a good predictor of the αrealized. The slope coefficient should be insignificantly different
from zero if most of the predictive power is due to the αimplied.
[Results table 11 about here]
The above results are consistent with the theory that option prices do not predict the firm-specific
ex-dividend day relative price decline. This is likely due to the fact that option traders cannot predict
the confounding factors that affect the overnight price around the ex-dividend day, and these factors
outweigh the differences in the expected decline caused by costs to arbitrage. Nonetheless, the inter-
cept for the full sample of 0.894496 is highly significant with a t-value of (37.07). A similar value is
observed in the regression of the option implied dividend on the cash dividend amount in 11, which
showed that option traders under-price the dividend indicating an expected price decline of 87% for
the full sample and 85% for the filtered sample.
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
Past work by (Barone-Adesi and Whaley, 1986), on estimating the expected stock price decline im-
plied by American call options, found the decline insignificantly different from the amount of the
dividend. However, using a much larger sample size, and a new method for estimating dividends
from option prices, developed by (Bae-Yosef and Sarig, 1992), I find that the expected stock price
decline implied by American call options is significantly less than the amount of the dividend. This
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has important implications for the pricing of options. Pricing a call option with an inflated dividend
amount produces a call that is too expensive, likewise it produces a put that is under-priced.
In addition, the results indicate several factors that have an effect on option pricing errors that
should be taken into account when using historical option prices in implied volatility and risk neutral
probability models. I find that option pricing errors are higher due to thin trading, non-synchronous
trading, and lower yields. I also find an increase in pricing errors for deep in-the-money, deep out-of-
the-money, and put-call pairs that are traded at opposing bids and asks. I propose that some of these
empirical effects, such as non-synchronous and thin trading, are the reason for an ex-dividend drop
larger than the arbitrage bounds demonstrated by Kalay (1982).
The results show that the ex-dividend stock price decline implied by American option prices is a
useful measure of the expected ex-dividend day price decline. The expected ex-dividend day stock
price decline has a mean of between 85% and 87% of the cash dividend. The implied stock price
change from options can be grossed up to produce an estimate of the market’s expectation of the
dividend. Dividend estimates are used in valuation models such as the Dividend Discount Model, as
well as pricing models for options, futures, and swaps. Investors are also interested in forecasts of
dividends because a change in cash dividend provides a credible signal to investors about changes
in firm earnings quality. It is because of the aforementioned reasons that management and analysts
often both provide dividend forecasts. The ability to use option prices, and the factors that affect its
accuracy, as an additional tool to estimate an expected dividend is therefore economically useful.
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TABLE 1: Frequency distributions for the number of individual put-call pairs by the degree to which the options are in-the-money (S/X) and by the time to
expiration of the options, (T ).
Ratio of stock price to exercise price Number of transactions Percent Time to expiration in weeks Number of transactions Percent
S/X < 0.75 11622 0.27% T < 2 5,346 0.12%
0.75 ≤ S/X < 0.8 16,446 0.38% 2 ≤ T < 4 6,276 0.15%
0.8 ≤ S/X < 0.85 46,845 1.09% 4 ≤ T < 6 16,446 0.38%
0.85 ≤ S/X < 0.9 156,919 3.65% 6 ≤ T < 8 46,845 1.09%
0.9 ≤ S/X < 0.95 613,447 14.25% 8 ≤ T < 10 156,919 3.65%
0.95 ≤ S/X < 1 1,958,836 45.52% 10 ≤ T < 12 613,447 14.25%
1 ≤ S/X < 1.05 945,193 21.96% 12 ≤ T < 14 1,958,836 45.52%
1.05 ≤ S/X < 1.1 322,644 7.50% 14 ≤ T < 16 945,193 21.96%
1.1 ≤ S/X < 1.15 123,455 2.87% 16 ≤ T < 18 322,644 7.50%
1.15 ≤ S/X < 1.2 51,799 1.20% 18 ≤ T < 20 123,455 2.87%
1.2 ≤ S/X < 1.25 24,950 0.58% 20 ≤ T < 22 51,799 1.20%
1.25 ≤ S/X < 1.3 12,691 0.29% 22 ≤ T < 24 24,950 0.58%
1.3 ≤ S/X < 1.35 6,886 0.16% 24 ≤ T < 26 12,691 0.29%
1.35 ≤ S/X < 1.4 3,837 0.09% 26 ≤ T < 28 6,886 0.16%
1.4 ≤ S/X < 1.45 2,539 0.06% 28 ≤ T < 30 3,837 0.09%
1.45 ≤ S/X < 1.5 1,472 0.03% 30 ≤ T < 32 2,539 0.06%
1.50 ≤ S/X 3,947 0.09% 32 ≤ T 5,419 0.13%
Total 4,303,528 100% Total 4,303,528 100%
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TABLE 2: Summary of the regression results for the cash dividend on the estimated realized relative ex-dividend stock price decline for individual stocks.
Measure γˆ0 γˆ1 Adj. R2
DROPovernight 0.19634 0.45473 0.4137
(30.70) (17.15)
DROPdaily 0.26937 -0.16306 0.1676
(80.19) (-12.03)
DROPadjusted 0.24145 0.23839 0.2547
(45.23) (12.59)
The regression equation is D = γ0 + γ1 ˆDROP + , where D is the realised dividend. Sample includes 17,818 dividend events.
DROPovernight is measured as the stock price on the close before the ex-dividend day minus the stock price on the opening of the ex-dividend
day.
DROPdaily is measured as the close before the ex-dividend day minus the close on the ex-dividend day.
DROPadjusted is measured as the DROPdaily adjusted by the expected return on the stock Si,B(E(ri) − ri,realized), the expected return E(r)i
is computed using the market model: E(ri|rmt) = αi + βirmt.
The values in parentheses are t-ratios based on White Heteroscedastic Consistent Errors.
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TABLE 3: Summary of the mean, median, and standard deviation of the pricing error by decile of the number of individual estimates per dividend event.
Decile Minimum count Maximum count No. of events. Mean Median Std Dev
1 2 2 1,185 0.51966 0.37590 0.48964
2 3 5 2,062 0.57058 0.50100 0.35473
3 6 9 1,539 0.57528 0.52185 0.30138
4 10 16 1,578 0.56377 0.51896 0.26267
5 17 28 1,545 0.54193 0.49674 0.24049
6 29 51 1,615 0.52665 0.47661 0.23612
7 52 95 1,573 0.51896 0.47905 0.22173
8 96 187 1,571 0.49614 0.45051 0.20927
9 188 529 1,588 0.46732 0.42429 0.19367
10 530 71175 1,584 0.41726 0.36497 0.17520
Total 2 71175 15,840 0.52108 0.46191 0.28216
p-value
GLM test for equality of means F-statistic 51.42 <0.001
Jonckheere-Terpstra trend in medians Z-statistic -11.5318 <0.001
Modified Brown-Forsythe Levene-type test for monotonic trend in variances 101.33 <0.001
Pricing error, s, calculated as the standard deviation of the relative difference between the implied dividend and the realized dividend,
(Dimplied −D)/D, for each dividend event.
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TABLE 4: Results for the standard deviation of the pricing by the degree to which the options are in-the-money.
Ratio of stock price to exercise price Mean pricing error Median pricing error Standard deviation No. of events Percent
0.75 ≤ S/X < 0.8 0.665515 0.654436 0.392236 1430 1.65%
0.8 ≤ S/X < 0.85 0.655417 0.625206 0.368740 2774 3.21%
0.85 ≤ S/X < 0.9 0.613488 0.579458 0.360673 5282 6.10%
0.9 ≤ S/X < 0.95 0.543469 0.505313 0.318858 9788 11.31%
0.95 ≤ S/X < 1 0.443068 0.380557 0.288769 14255 16.47%
1 ≤ S/X < 1.05 0.443238 0.371688 0.280799 14602 16.87%
1.05 ≤ S/X < 1.1 0.513776 0.452150 0.304945 11756 13.58%
1.1 ≤ S/X < 1.15 0.543937 0.493168 0.326709 8606 9.94%
1.15 ≤ S/X < 1.2 0.564086 0.512656 0.350467 5973 6.90%
1.2 ≤ S/X < 1.25 0.566088 0.513062 0.363074 4126 4.77%
1.25 ≤ S/X < 1.3 0.573306 0.531491 0.375342 2890 3.34%
1.3 ≤ S/X < 1.35 0.587608 0.517491 0.402739 1984 2.29%
1.35 ≤ S/X < 1.4 0.597200 0.539364 0.404804 1370 1.58%
1.4 ≤ S/X < 1.45 0.587043 0.527096 0.403103 1024 1.18%
1.45 ≤ S/X < 1.5 0.551152 0.491197 0.389973 685 0.79%
Total 0.512894 0.450851 0.324217 86545 100.00%
Mack-Wolfe-Chen Peak Unknown A∗pˆ Statistic 39.067
Estimated peak group pˆ 0.95 ≤ S/X < 1
Monte Carlo (10,000 iterations) p-value < 0.001
The reciprocal of the standard deviation of the pricing was used in order to transform the umbrella to fit the Mack-Wolfe test.
Estimated peak group represents the valley (lowest median pricing error).
Pricing error, s, calculated as the standard deviation of the relative difference between the implied dividend and the realized dividend,
(Dimplied −D)/D, for each dividend event.
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TABLE 5: Results of the volume robustness test for the pricing error by the degree to which options are in-the-money.
Ratio of stock price to exercise price Mean pricing error Median pricing error Standard deviation Mean volume per event
0.8 ≤ S/X < 0.85 0.677668 0.666745 0.303589 15.12727
0.85 ≤ S/X < 0.9 0.645549 0.632600 0.349265 14.17576
0.9 ≤ S/X < 0.95 0.566909 0.518968 0.324421 14.50152
0.95 ≤ S/X < 1 0.471505 0.416603 0.319019 14.31212
1 ≤ S/X < 1.05 0.461638 0.393389 0.302974 14.54545
1.05 ≤ S/X < 1.1 0.540417 0.473049 0.311026 14.55000
1.1 ≤ S/X < 1.15 0.552477 0.500461 0.331331 14.25455
1.15 ≤ S/X < 1.2 0.577878 0.542366 0.333708 14.11212
1.2 ≤ S/X < 1.25 0.614725 0.586449 0.349198 14.03485
1.25 ≤ S/X < 1.3 0.612558 0.581061 0.357829 14.08636
Total 0.571245 0.525767 0.335240 14.36364
Mack-Wolfe-Chen Peak Unknown A∗pˆ Statistic 11.433
Estimated peak group pˆ 1 ≤ S/X < 1.05
Monte Carlo (10,000 iterations) p-value < 0.001
The reciprocal of the standard deviation of the pricing was used in order to transform the umbrella to fit the Mack-Wolfe test.
Estimated peak group represents the valley (lowest median pricing error).
Pricing error, s, calculated as the standard deviation of the relative difference between the implied dividend and the realized dividend,
(Dimplied −D)/D, for each dividend event.
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TABLE 6: Results for the standard deviation of the pricing by decile of time, in minutes, between the matched call and put option pairs.
Time between paired put and call in minutes Mean pricing error Median pricing error Standard deviation No. of events Percent
T < 1 0.326948 0.262589 0.249246 9,331 8.30%
1 ≤ T < 2 0.31983 0.251283 0.247097 9,275 8.25%
2 ≤ T < 3 0.320643 0.255371 0.242132 8,404 7.47%
3 ≤ T < 4 0.343054 0.276788 0.245432 9,528 8.47%
5 ≤ T < 8 0.374485 0.303039 0.257452 10,506 9.34%
9 ≤ T < 14 0.402382 0.331764 0.266831 10,971 9.76%
15 ≤ T < 25 0.438898 0.365691 0.278349 11,717 10.42%
26 ≤ T < 47 0.473461 0.400944 0.289368 12,845 11.42%
48 ≤ T < 101 0.52153 0.458988 0.294712 13,955 12.41%
102 ≤ T < 522 0.597621 0.551951 0.314775 15,908 14.15%
Total 0.43383 0.359401 0.291414 112,440 100.00%
p-value
GLM test for equality of means F-statistic 1186.43 <0.001
Jonckheere-Terpstra trend in medians Z-statistic 109.0832 <0.001
Modified Brown-Forsythe Levene-type test for monotonic trend in variances -91.151 <0.001
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TABLE 7: Results for the pricing error based on combinations of put-call bid-ask.
Mean Standard deviation Median No. of observations
C: Ask P: Ask 0.471371967 0.282135441 0.410257775 12212
C: Ask P: Bid 0.495010901 0.278108499 0.433918755 14955
C: Bid P: Ask 0.489630957 0.279118392 0.425400793 26162
C: Bid P: Bid 0.477633053 0.286919106 0.414576771 14166
Tukey’s Studentized Range (HSD) Test for difference in means.
C: Ask C: Ask C: Bid
P: Ask P: Bid P: Ask
C: Ask P: Bid -0.023639***
C: Bid P: Ask -0.018259*** 0.005380
C: Bid P: Bid -0.006261 0.017378*** 0.011998***
GLM equality of means F-statistic 17.94 p-value <0.001
Pricing error, s, calculated as the standard deviation of the relative difference between the implied dividend and the realized dividend,
(Dimplied − D)/D, for each dividend event. Four standard deviations are calculated for each dividend event using four combinations of
matched put and call depending on whether the trades occurred at the bid or the ask. Calls and puts are represented as C and P, respectively.
Tukey’s Studentized Range (HSD) Test controls the Type I experimentwise error rate.
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ***.
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TABLE 8: Summary of the mean, median, and standard deviation of the standard deviation of pricing by decile of dividend yield.
Decile Minimum yield Maximum yield Mean Median Std Dev
1 0.00014 0.00229 0.85458 0.85136 0.28369
2 0.002294 0.00332 0.72038 0.69895 0.27218
3 0.00332 0.00422 0.62189 0.58967 0.25169
4 0.004219 0.00515 0.54997 0.51379 0.23403
5 0.005154 0.00621 0.49849 0.44575 0.24047
6 0.00621 0.00747 0.44780 0.39036 0.22597
7 0.007476 0.00916 0.41813 0.36034 0.21627
8 0.009157 0.01173 0.39952 0.34738 0.20571
9 0.011728 0.01733 0.36983 0.32775 0.19305
10 0.01734 0.13557 0.31265 0.29768 0.16804
Total 0.00014 0.13557 0.52108 0.28216 0.46191
p-value
GLM test for equality of means F-statistic 845.45 <0.001
Jonckheere-Terpstra trend in medians Z-statistic -78.5589 <0.001
Modified Brown-Forsythe Levene-type test for monotonic trend in variances 46.316 <0.001
Pricing error, s, calculated as the standard deviation of the relative difference between the implied dividend and the realized dividend,
(Dimplied −D)/D, for each dividend event.
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TABLE 9: Descriptive statistics for the relative ex-dividend stock price decline implied by option prices and realized ex-dividend stock price decline from
overnight stock price changes.
Overnight alpha Implied alpha
Sample No. of obs. Mean t-statistic Median Std. Dev. Mean t-statistic Median Std. Dev.
All observations 17818 0.763177 16.8 0.827658 1.88124 0.894496 37.07 0.871584 0.37995
Filtered sample 4943 0.815024 13.77 0.860465 0.94456 0.842144 35.36 0.850048 0.31385
Overnight Alpha is the relative ex-dividend stock price decline, αrealized = SB−SOD , where SB is the closing stock price the day before the
ex-dividend date, SO is the opening stock price on the ex-dividend date, and D is the realized cash dividend amount.
Implied Alpha is the option implied relative ex-dividend stock price decline, αimplied = IDIVD , where IDIV is the dividend amount implied
by option prices from 4.6, and D is the realized cash dividend amount.
t-statistic tests the null H0 : µ = 1 with alternative HA : µ < 1
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TABLE 10: Mean prediction errors of implied and historical estimates of the relative ex-dividend stock price decline from the estimated relative ex-dividend
stock price decline for individual stocks.
Sample No. of obs. Predictor MAPE MSPE
All observations 17818 Implied 1.198090 3.682731
Historical 2.524656 171.7672
Filtered observations 4943 Implied 0.659592 1.008796
Historical 1.160633 5.372345
The estimated realised relative ex-dividend stock price decline is equal to (SB − SA)/D for each ex-dividend event. Where SB is the closing
price of the stock the day before the ex-dividend date and SA is the opening price on the ex-dividend date.
MAPE is the mean absolute prediction error, that is, MAPE = 1
n
∑n
j |Aj − Pj|, where Aj is the realised stock price decline estimate (see
footnote a) for the jth stock, Pj is the predicted stock price decline estimate for the jth stock, and n is the number of dividend estimates.
MSPE is the mean squared prediction error, that is MAPE = 1
n
∑n
j (Aj − Pj)2.
The implied relative ex-dividend stock price decline is equal to IDIV/D where IDIV is the average of the daily company-specific dividend
estimates, and D is the cash dividend amount.
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TABLE 11: Results for the regression of the option implied relative ex-dividend stock price decline on the realized relative ex-dividend stock price decline.
Sample No. of events γˆ0 γˆ1 Adj R2
All observations 17818 0.70821 0.06145 0.0001
(18.93) (1.47)
Filtered sample 4943 0.89011 -0.08916 0.0007
(22.08) (-1.83)
The regression equation is αˆrealized = γ0 + γ1αˆimplied + 
The estimated realised relative ex-dividend stock price decline is equal to (SB − SA)/D for each ex-dividend event. Where SB is the closing
price of the stock the day before the ex-dividend date and SA is the opening price on the ex-dividend date.
The values in parentheses are t-ratios based on White Heteroscedastic Consistent Errors.
3
Analyst Dividend Forecast Accuracy and
Option-Implied Dividend Forecasts
3.1 Introduction
Dividends have direct cash flow and signalling effects for firms and investors. This is the rationale for
why dividend forecasts are used to proxy for market dividend expectations, and a change in forecast
is used as a measure of dividend surprise. Finance and accounting researchers use surprise measures
to empirically test signalling theories about the relationship between dividend changes and future
earnings or cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985).
Dividend forecast accuracy is also important because analysts use assumptions of future dividends
to forecast earnings and develop buy-sell recommendations. Barker (1999) investigates, using partic-
ipant observation; questionnaires; and semi-structured interviews, the role of dividends in valuation
models used by UK fund managers and analysts. He finds that analysts primarily use Price-Earnings
40
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and Dividend Yield in their valuation models. He finds that value-relevance of information varies
with the reliability of forecasts. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994) also find support for the link between
dividends and earnings forecasts. They find that analysts significantly revise their earnings forecasts
following a change in dividends. In addition, Loh and Mian (2006) find that analysts with superior
earnings forecast accuracy produce recommendations that are more profitable than other analysts.
This implies that superior analysts use more accurate dividend forecasts to forecast earnings and gen-
erate more profitable recommendations. These studies imply that the better analysts are at forecasting
dividends, the more they will rely on this information to forecast earnings, and the more profitable
their recommendations to investors.
This chapter investigates the relationship between analyst dividend forecasts and market expecta-
tions of dividends implied by option prices. The primary research question is whether analysts update
their dividend forecasts in response to new market information, and likewise, whether the market up-
dates dividend expectations in response to analyst forecast revisions. Users of analyst forecasts, such
as investors, are interested in whether analysts, or a superior subset of analysts, update their forecasts
in response to new information. Market participants, such as option traders, would also find it useful
to know whether analyst dividend forecasts contain new information that may affect market prices. I
answer this question by comparing individual analyst dividend forecasts with implied dividends from
option prices as per the methodology in the first chapter.
Extending a concept in Baginski and Hassell (1990), that analysts play a role in interpreting the
quality of information produced by management revisions and other sources, I find evidence that su-
perior analysts are more likely to update their dividend forecasts in response to changes in the market
information about the expected dividend. I do not find a similar result for non-superior analysts, as
they are less likely to increase their forecasts in response to increases in the market expectations of
the dividend. My results indicate that analysts could use option-implied dividends to inform their own
dividend forecasts, increasing the accuracy of the dividend yield used as an input in their stock valua-
tion models. However, unlike previous studies1 that found a market response to earnings revisions, I
found no evidence for a option market response to analyst dividend forecast revisions. This finding is
important because it contradicts the idea that the market finds analyst dividend forecasts informative.
The second focus of this chapter investigates whether dividend forecasts implied by options, su-
perior analysts, non-superior, or consensus analysts provide more precise forecasts of firm dividends.
1(Gleason and Lee, 2003; Park and Stice, 2000)
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Researchers can better test dividend signalling theories, and value-relevancy of accounting measures,
by calculating a dividend surprise measure using a more precise forecast of market expectations of
the dividend. Analysts, investors, and industry can also calculate stock prices that are closer to fun-
damental value when they use more precise dividend forecasts as inputs in their models. My results
show that dividends implied by option prices provide a more precise forecast of future dividends than
individual analyst and superior analyst forecasts but are not more accurate than the mean consensus
dividend forecast. The result is also important because it explains how non-superior analysts
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 contains a discussion of the literature on the analyst
forecasts and dividends implied by option prices. Section 2 outlines my method of estimating the div-
idend implied from American option transaction prices, and the various tests used to test my research
questions. Section 3 presents the results, analysis and discussion. Section 4 summarizes my paper
and provides directions for future research.
3.1.1 Analyst forecasts
Analysts have a trade-off between timeliness and accuracy when developing forecasts based on new
information from management revisions to earnings or other sources. Baginski and Hassell (1990)
show that analysts either use the information in stock price changes following management revisions
or obtain similar information from other sources in order to inform their own earning forecast revi-
sions. Only part of analyst revisions are explained by either management revisions or the stock price
reaction to the revision. This implies that analysts may play a role in interpreting the quality of the
information provided by management revisions. Therefore, I expect analysts to change their dividend
forecasts based on either a change in the dividend implied by option prices, information from their
own sources, or management revisions.
The aforementioned study establishes a relationship between price reactions from management
announcements and earnings revisions by all analysts as a group. Park and Stice (2000) study the
price effect of forecast announcements by analysts with past superior forecasting accuracy. They find
that earnings forecast announcements by analysts with superior past forecasts for a specific firm have
a greater impact on security prices than the announcements of previously less accurate analysts. They
find the price effects from analyst announcements were confined to firms with past superior forecast-
ing and not to all firms by those analysts. The failure to find a spillover effect suggests that the market
keeps track of the firm-specific forecasting performance by specific analysts. They also investigate
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the potential source of the information used by analysts and valued by the market by considering price
impact before and after management announcements. They find that superior analysts have a greater
impact on price in the 30 days preceding an earnings announcement by management compared with
the 30 days following. This suggests that analysts with superior forecasting ability have inside infor-
mation as opposed to a superior ability to interpret and integrate information revealed in an earnings
announcement. Therefore, I expect the option implied dividend changes to have a stronger response
to dividend forecast revisions by analysts with superior firm-specific past forecast accuracy.
Another aspect of the price reaction to analyst revisions is the magnitude and time it takes for
the market to incorporate the new information into the price. Gleason and Lee (2003) study factors
that help explain the post-revision price drift following analyst forecast revisions. They find that the
market treats high innovation revisions, that provide the market with new information, the same as low
innovation revisions that move an analyst’s forecast toward the consensus. They also find that the price
adjusts faster and incorporates more of the information from Institutional All-Star analysts than other
less well known but highly accurate analysts. They find that firms with low analyst coverage have
decreased price discovery efficiency compared with firms with high analyst coverage. Unfortunately,
due to a change in policy by Thomson Reuters, analyst names have been anonymized for our sample
period and I am unable to use Institutional All-Star dummies in this study. However, I am able to
examine superior analysts using past analyst accuracy compared with the consensus analyst forecast.
Many earlier studies, documented by Brown (1993), find that analyst earnings forecasts are op-
timistically biased. A similar investigation into the accuracy of dividends by Brown, Clarke, How,
and Lim (2002) find that analysts’ dividend forecasts are also optimistically biased but less biased
and more accurate than their earnings forecasts. They find that forecast accuracy is positively corre-
lated with proxies for the amount of information available about the firm, and negatively correlated
with proxies for the level of uncertainty about the firm’s future operating performance. However, op-
tion traders do not operate under the same incentives as sell-side financial analysts, such as favourable
forecasts for management access or to promote brokerage volume. Therefore, I expect option-implied
dividend forecasts to be more accurate than analyst forecasts.
Many previous studies into dividend surprises use a naive dividend change model that assumes the
most recent dividend amount is the next expected dividend amount. This measure does not capture
the surprise when the market is expecting a change in dividend based on other sources of information.
Dhillon, Raman, and Ramirez (2003) use Value Line Forecasts to proxy for market expectations of
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dividends in order to calculate a measure of dividend surprise. They find that stock price reactions
and earnings changes in response to dividend surprises are more consistent with dividend signaling
models. They also show that previous event studies that exclude firms with no dividend change
incorrectly exclude observations when analysts are expecting a change. They conclude that future
empirical research should incorporate dividend forecasts. I extend their work by comparing analyst
forecasts with a measure of dividend surprise based on dividends implied by option prices.
3.1.2 Dividend expectations implied by option prices
Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992) develop a method to measure dividend surprise that is based on the
expected dividend implied from American option transaction prices. They find that the measure is
highly correlated with the market price reaction to announcements and outperforms the naive model,
a Box-Jenkins time-series measure, and Value-Line Investor Survey. The measure is also shown to be
insensitive to the extent to which the options are in or out of the money. I expand on their methodology
in the following section.
3.2 Methodology and data
First, I estimate the market expectations of the ex-dividend day drop from the option and stock data.
Second, I develop a measure of dividend surprise by calculating the change in option-implied dividend
expectations. Third, I calculate a measure of analyst forecast surprise using analyst dividend forecast
revisions. Additionally, I identify superior analysts based on their past performance relative to the
consensus forecast accuracy. Finally, I regress the models of option-implied dividend surprise and
analyst forecast surprise and present the results.
3.2.1 Estimation of the option-implied dividend forecast
In the first thesis chapter, I expand on a methodology developed by Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992) to
impute dividend expectations from option market prices. I use changes in option-implied dividend as
a proxy for the dividend surprise. Expected dividends are calculated using option put-call parity; the
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following equation holds for European options:
PV (DIV ) = S − (c− p+KBt) (3.1)
where PV (DIV ) is the current value of expected interim dividends; S, c, and p are the prices of the
underlying stock, the European call, and the European put, respectively; K is the common exercise
price; and Bt is the time-t price of a pure discount bond maturing on the options’ common expiration
day.
Equation 3.1 is based on European option prices. Since I can only observe American options, I
need to take into account the premium due to the right of early exercise. I define the American over
European option premium, for calls and puts, by:
∆c ≡ C − c ≥ 0 (3.2)
∆p ≡ P − p ≥ 0 (3.3)
where C and P are American call and put prices, respectively. Equation 3.1 can now be written as
PV (DIV ) = S − (c+ ∆c− (p+ ∆p) +KBt) (3.4)
American options will not be exercised early, and therefore have an equivalent price to European
options, whenever:
D ≤ K(1− e−R(T−t)) (3.5)
where D is the dividend, R is the forward rate between the dividend payout time, t, and the expiration
date, T, as observed at time t, and K is the exercise price of the option.
My estimation procedure matches the two closest observations, based on time, where a put and
call with the same exercise price and expiration date occur on the same day. Transactions are only
matched to a single pair but there may exist many pairs on any given day. I find 80,898 put-call trade
pairs, approximately 8.37% of my original sample, meet the condition in equation 3.5 and I use a
modified equation 3.1 to calculate the future value of the dividend, for these transactions:
IDIV =
(
S − C + P −K exp (−R(TM − t))) exp (R(TX − t)) (3.6)
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where IDIV is the future value, at the ex-dividend day TX , of the cash dividend, C, P , K are the
call, put, and strike prices, S is the mean of stock trade prices that occur between the put-call pair,
TM is the time of maturity, and R is the forward rate.
American call options that do not meet the condition in equation 3.5 will be exercised the day
before the ex-dividend date due to the expected stock price decline. Whereas, American put options
that do not meet the the condition in 3.5 will be exercised on or after the ex-dividend date depending
on moneyness. If the interest on the proceeds from early exercise exceed the time value of money
then early exercise is optimal:
(K − S)(1− e−R(T−t)) > T.V. (3.7)
where T.V. is the time value of the option, and the remaining notation is the same as equation 3.5.
Based on the expected price decline due to the dividend, I anticipate an insignificant marginal dif-
ference in the European vs American put option premium.23 Therefore, the remaining option pairs
that do not satisfy equation 3.5 are estimated using equation 3.6 with the maturity date TM set to the
ex-dividend date TX due to early exercise.
The ex-dividend stock price decline implied by options is downwardly biased due to short-term
tax-induced trading, arbitrage, and tax-clientele effects. I need to adjust upward my option-implied
dividend estimates to allow a fair comparison of the forecast accuracy between option-implied div-
idends and analyst forecasts. I estimate the ex-dividend day relative stock decline, α, and adjust
upward my estimates of the dividend expectations as per the first thesis chapter Guerrero (2017). The
adjusted option-implied dividends are denoted IDIV A.
3.2.2 Consensus analyst forecast
I compare the price-based measure of dividend surprises to the I/B/E/S analyst consensus dividend
forecast. The expected quarterly dividend payment is calculated as the difference between annual
dividends as forecast just before the dividend announcement and the already-paid dividend amounts
divided by the remaining number of dividend payments for that year. These expectations are denoted
by CDIV .
2Gray (1989) finds in favour of put-call parity holding when taking into account the potential rational early exercise
of an option and the possibility that dividends and capitalisation changes will differ from expectations.
3Whaley (1982) finds only a half-percent difference in pricing between European and American options.
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3.2.3 Superior analysts
I use a similar selection criteria from Park and Stice (2000) to designate analysts as superior forecast-
ers of dividends for specific firms. An analyst is classed as superior for a specific firm if 80% or more
of the analyst’s forecasts for that firm were closer to realised earnings than was the I/B/E/S consensus
forecast, CDIV , existing at the time the forecasts were given. In order to qualify, as superior, the
analyst must have provided at least four forecasts. In addition, the analyst must not be the sole ana-
lyst in the consensus forecast. I classify the dividend forecast for superior analysts and denote these
forecasts by SDIV .
3.2.4 Predictive ability of forecasts
I can test whether the various dividend forecasts are able to predict the subsequently realized cash
dividend amounts by comparing two measures of predictive error. I calculate the Mean Absolute
Predictive Error as,
MAPE =
1
n
n∑
j=1
|Djt − Fjt|
Pjx
(3.8)
where Djt is the realized dividend amount for the jth stock at time t, Fj is the dividend forecast, for
the jth stock at time t, Pjx is the stock price two days before the ex-dividend date at time x, and n is
the number of observations for the year. The dividend forecasts, defined previously, are the Adjusted
Option-implied (IDIV A), Consensus analyst (CDIV ), Individual Analyst ADIV , and Superior
analyst (SDIV ). I also calculate the Mean Squared Predictive Error as,
MSPE =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(Djt − Fjt)2
Pjx
. (3.9)
Finally, I can test the predictive power of the forecasts by regressing the forecast values on the
realized values of the cash dividend, that is,
Dˆj = γ0 + γ1Pˆj + j (3.10)
If the estimated coefficients γˆ0 and γˆ1 are indistinguishable from zero and one, respectively, then
the forecaster is a good predictor of the realized cash dividend amount. The slope coefficient should
be insignificantly different from zero if most of the predictive power is due to the forecast.
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3.2.5 Analyst forecast revision response to new market information
Baginski and Hassell (1990) find that analysts update their earnings forecasts based on new informa-
tion from management revisions to earnings or other sources. This suggests that analysts are likely to
update their dividend forecasts in response to timely market information. Therefore, I formulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Analysts increase their dividend forecasts when there is an increase in the option-
implied dividend.
In order to answer the above hypothesis, I construct a forecast surprise measure using the same
approach as Park and Stice (2000); Stickel (1992); Lys and Sohn (1990). Since Stickel (1991) finds
that the best measure of forecast surprise is based on the most recent forecast by the same analyst, I
construct my forecast surprise measure as follows:
FRijt =
DPSFijt −DPSFijr
Pi,t−2
(3.11)
where DPSFijt is the dividend per share forecast for firm i by analyst j on day t, DPSFijr is the
most recent DPS forecast for firm i by analyst j, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days
before forecast revision at day t.
In order to answer the question of whether analysts update their dividend forecasts in response to
changes in market information, I need to measure the change in option-implied dividend forecasts. I
use the change in the mean option-implied dividend, for the week following the previous ex-dividend
date, and the mean option-implied dividend for the week following the analyst forecast revision. I
define the option-implied dividend forecast revision as:
IDIV FRit =
IDIVit − IDIVir
Pi,t−2
(3.12)
where IDIVit is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during
the week preceding analyst revision at day t, IDIVir is the mean option-implied dividend per share
for firm i for options traded during the week following the previous ex-dividend day at time r, and
Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast revision at day t.
In the previous thesis chapter, Guerrero (2017), I find that the option-implied dividend is a noisy
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FIGURE 3.1: Option-implied forecast revision measure timeline
r r+5 t-5 t
IDIVitIDIVir
measure of the expected dividend due to transaction costs, moneyness of the options, thin-trading,
non-synchronous trading, and dividend yield. I use a latent variable model and probit regressions
as I am primarily interested in the likelihood of a change in either the market prices or the analyst
forecasts, and not necessarily in a linear relationship. Consider the latent variable model,
y∗i = x
′
iβ + i (3.13)
where y∗i is an unobservable latent variable that measures the change in analyst dividend forecasts,
xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters and i is a random
disturbance term. I assume that y∗i is related to the observed variable yi, in the following way,
y =
1, if y
∗
i > 0
0, otherwise
(3.14)
I can use option-implied forecasts as a proxy for new information available to the market about the
expected dividend. I can see whether analysts incorporate this information into their forecast revisions
using a probit model to regress the option-implied forecast revision on the analyst forecast surprise,
that is,
FˆRijt = γ0 + γ1 ˆIDIV FRit + j (3.15)
Barker (1999) find that the forecast accuracy of analysts is dependent on the value-relevance of
the information used in their valuation models. He finds that the primary inputs to analyst forecasts
are earnings and dividend yields. Therefore, I expect superior analysts to incorporate more timely
market information in their dividend forecasts, and formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Superior analysts are more likely to increase their dividend forecasts when there is an
increase in the option-implied dividend.
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I can test whether this effect holds for a more direct proxy of the market’s expectations of divi-
dends, than stock price, by including a dummy variable for superior analysts in equation 4.14,
FˆRijt = γ0 + γ1 ˆIDIV FRit + γ2 ˆSDIV ijt ˆIDIV FRit + j (3.16)
where FˆRijt and ˆIDIV FRit are dummy variables that indicate an analyst revision or option-
implied dividend increase, based on definitions from equation 4.6 and 3.12, and ˆSDIV ijt is a dummy
to indicate analyst j is a superior analyst for firm i at time t.
3.2.6 Market response to analyst dividend forecast revisions
Likewise, in order to answer the question of whether the market update their dividend forecasts in
response to changes in analyst revisions, I need to measure the change in option implied dividend
forecasts as a result of analyst information releases. I use the change in the mean estimate before and
after the analyst forecast. Therefore, I define the analyst revision option-implied forecast surprise as:
IDIV SPit =
IDIVit − IDIVif
Pi,t−2
(3.17)
where IDIVit is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during
the week preceding analyst revision at day t, IDIVif is the mean option-implied dividend per share
for firm i for options traded during the week following the day after the analyst revision at day t, and
Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast revision at day t.
FIGURE 3.2: Option-implied forecast surprise measure timeline
t-5 t t+5
IDIVit IDIVif
As mentioned previously, Gleason and Lee (2003) find that the market price adopts new informa-
tion from analyst earnings forecast revisions. Likewise, I expect option market prices to update in
response to analyst dividend forecast revisions.
Hypothesis 3. The market increases the option-implied dividend amount in response to an increase
in the dividend forecast by analysts.
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Using a similar probit model to equation 4.14, I can test whether the market responds to released of
new analyst forecasts by regressing the analyst forecast revision on the change in the market implied-
option prices, that is,
ˆIDIV SP it = γ0 + γ1FˆRijt + j (3.18)
As discussed earlier, Gleason and Lee (2003) find that the market treats high innovation revisions, that
provide the market with new information, the same as low innovation revisions that move an analyst’s
forecast toward the consensus. They also find that the market reacts more strongly for Institutional All-
Star analysts compared with other superior analysts. I am unable to investigate the market response to
All-star analysts due to Thomson Reuter’s anonymization of analysts for my sample period. However,
I am able to check whether the option market are more likely to respond to superior analysts compared
with other analysts. Park and Stice (2000) find that earnings forecast announcements by superior
analysts have a greater impact on security prices than less accurate analysts. I expect their results to
apply to dividend announcements, and formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The market is more likely to increase the option-implied dividend amount in response
to an increase in the dividend forecast by superior analysts compared with non-superior analysts.
I can test the above hypothesis by incorporating a dummy variable for superior analysts into the
probit regression equation 3.18,
ˆIDIV SP it = γ0 + γ1FˆRijt + γ2 ˆSDIV ijtFˆRijt + j (3.19)
where FˆRijt and ˆIDIV SP it are dummy variables that indicate an analyst revision or option-
implied dividend increase, based on definitions from equation 3.6 and 3.1, and ˆSDIV ijt is a dummy
to indicate analyst j is a superior analyst for firm i at time t.
3.2.7 Data
The data in my study are compiled from three sources: OptionMetrics, Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S,
and Thomson Reuters Tick History.
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Analyst forecast data
The sample begins with all sell-side analyst forecasts for U.S. firms from years 2009 to 2015. I
exclude 45,892 analyst dividend forecasts because the announcement date of the forecast is after the
financial period end date of the dividend. I also exclude 267 semi-annual forecasts. I exclude analyst
forecasts where the analyst has issued more than 13 revisions, the 99th percentile, for any dividend
event. This results in 618,574 quarterly estimates prior to matching with firms and quarters for which
I am able to calculate option-implied dividends.
The above filters result in 132,442 individual forecasts for 1,857 dividend events, by 689 analysts
for 453 firms. There are 302 analysts that are superior analysts of at least one firm. The descriptive
statistics from Table 3.2 show that during my sample period, 2009-2015, approximately 30.05% of
dividends increased from the previous dividend and the remainder, 70.17% decreased or were un-
changed from the previous dividend amount.
Option data
I analyse data from years 2009 to 2015. Using end-of-day data and dividend event data from Option-
Metrics, I compile a list of firm-years that match the following filter: at least a single daily traded
volume of 30 for an option instrument with a single ex-dividend date between the trade date and
option maturity. Using these firm-years, I collect all option and underlying stock tick data from
ThomsonReuters Tick History from 2009-2015. My final sample consists of 9,334 firm-years from
1,908 firms.
I exclude dividend events where the stock price moves more than 10% from the close the day
before the ex-dividend date to the opening on the ex-dividend date. I exclude, due to the unavailability
of future dividend event information, option maturities with expiration past the dividend event sample
period of 31st December 2015. I exclude estimated dividend yields greater than 10%. This reduces
the sample approximately 0.01% from 4,818,361 to 4,817,818 individual estimates.
I truncate at the 2nd and 98th percentiles for the individual dividend estimates, implied alpha, and
overnight realized alpha. This reduces the sample by approximately 10.6% to 4,303,528 individual
estimates. When the option-implied dividends are matched to the analyst dividend forecasts from
I/B/E/S the final sample of individual option dividend estimates reduces to 1,279,588.
The ratio of the stock price to exercise price and the time in weeks to expiration are detailed in
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Table 1. 74.13% of the transactions are in the money, that is, the options have a S/X ratio above 1.
The largest category of time to maturity is between two and four weeks with 138,884 option pairs.
However, the number of transactions doesn’t linearly decrease with increasing time to maturity. The
second highest category is twenty to twenty-two weeks with 136,372.
3.3 Results
The first two sections of results provide evidence for the earlier hypotheses about analyst and market
behaviour and the causality of forecast revisions. The final section of results examines the accuracy
of analyst forecasts based on measures developed in section 3.2.4.
3.3.1 Do analysts react to market revisions?
Analysts update their earnings forecasts based on new information from management revisions or
other sources (Baginski and Hassell, 1990). Based on this result, I formulated Hypothesis 1, that
analysts increase their dividend forecasts when there is an increase in the option-implied dividend.
In addition, superior analysts possibly have more accurate forecasts because they update their fore-
casts in response to changes in publicly available information about upcoming dividends. using this
intuition, I proposed Hypothesis 2, that superior analysts are more likely to increase their dividend
forecasts when there is an increase in the option-implied dividend.
I find strong evidence that, unlike non-superior analysts, superior analysts respond to changes in
dividend pricing information available to the market. The results from Table 3.5 show that other ana-
lysts are less likely (42.63%) to increase their dividend forecasts upward in response to an increase in
the option-implied dividend forecast compared with superior analysts (69.84%). This result provides
evidence to support Hypothesis 2 but not Hypothesis 1. Just as Baginski and Hassell (1990) finds
that analysts update their earnings forecasts based on new information from management revisions
to earnings or other sources, this result supports the hypothesis that superior analysts update their
dividend forecasts in a similar manner. Barker (1999) shows that dividend yields are a primary input
to analyst forecast models, and this results contributes to our understanding by showing that analysts
update their dividend forecasts based on new market information.
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3.3.2 Does the market react to analyst revisions?
Gleason and Lee (2003) find that the market price adopts new information from analyst earnings
forecast revisions. I expect market reaction to extend to analyst dividend forecast revisions. Earlier,
I formulated Hypothesis 3: the market increases the option-implied dividend amount in response to
an increase in the dividend forecast by analysts. In addition, Park and Stice (2000) find that earn-
ings forecast announcements by superior analysts have a greater impact on security prices than less
accurate analysts. Therefore, I defined Hypothesis 4: the market is more likely to increase the option-
implied dividend amount in response to an increase in the dividend forecast by superior analysts
compared with non-superior analysts.
After finding, in the previous results section, that superior analysts update their forecasts in re-
sponse to market information, it comes as a surprise that there is no significant market response to
analyst revisions. The results from Table 3.4 provide no evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 or 4. The
forecast revision dummy variable has a p-value of 0.1373 and the superior analyst forecast revision
dummy variable has a p-value of 0.9906. The alternative to hypothesis 3 and 4 is that the market does
not react to analyst forecast revisions. These results show no evidence that the earnings revision mar-
ket response effect, found by Gleason and Lee (2003) and Park and Stice (2000), extends to a market
response in the dividend information implied by option prices. In the next section, my analysis of the
accuracy of the different forecast measures provides more insight into these results.
3.3.3 Accuracy of analyst forecasts and option-implied dividends
This section examines differences in accuracy between the analyst and option-implied forecast mea-
sures. A comparison of accuracy is important for two reasons: firstly, accuracy has direct profitability
consequences for market participants who use dividend forecasts to model stock and derivative prices;
and, secondly, it helps explain why we find superior analysts updating their forecasts in response to
new market information and why the market does not respond to analyst revisions.
In section 3.2.4, I define two measures of forecast accuracy MAPE and MSPE. The mean pre-
diction errors of Adjusted Option-Implied Dividends (IDIV A), Consensus Analyst Dividend Fore-
cast (CDIV ), Individual analysts (ADIV ), and Superior analysts (SDIV ), are presented in Table
3.3. Ranked from most accurate to least accurate based on MAPE and MSPE are: All Analysts,
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Superior Analysts, Option-implied, and Consensus analyst forecasts. Although, option-implied fore-
casts are only marginally more accurate, about 11%, than superior analysts when comparing MAPE,
superior analyst MSPE is about 172% larger. The results are similar for all analysts, with a 40%
larger MAPE, but 244% larger MSPE than option-implied dividend forecast. MSPE is affected
by larger individual variations from the accurate forecast compared with the MAPE. This indicates
that whilst analysts and option-implied forecasts have a similar level of accuracy, analysts tend to
have less frequent but larger deviations compared with option-implied forecasts. This effect is not
seen in the consensus analyst forecast, which has a MSPE that is comparable to the option-implied
forecast. It appears that analysts tend not to herd together, allowing the consensus mean forecast to
not shift too far from the actual dividend when a single analyst makes a bold but erroneous forecast.
Whilst the consensus analyst forecast is more accurate than the option-implied dividends, the
individual analyst forecasts, even from superior analysts, is not. This is possibly why, in the previous
results section, there is no significant evidence of a market reaction to changes for individual analyst
forecasts. As individual analyst forecasts are less accurate, option market participants can’t improve
their forecasts by incorporating analyst revisions and therefore do not react to revisions.
As mentioned in the previous section, non-superior analysts are less likely to revise their forecasts
in response to new information about the dividend compared with superior analysts. The failure
of non-superior analysts to update their forecasts in response to market information is probably a
contributing factor to their higher MAPE and MSPE.
Another interesting result, from Table 3.3, is that although the individual analyst estimates are less
accurate than option-implied dividends, the consensus analyst is more accurate based on the MAPE
and MSPE. This is likely due to the role that the consensus forecast plays in aggregating the point-
estimates of analyst forecasts into an expectation of analyst beliefs in a similar way to how the market
aggregates the dividend beliefs of individual option traders when determining option prices based on
supply and demand.
3.4 Conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between analyst dividend forecasts and market expectations
of dividends implied by option prices. My primary research question is whether analysts update
their forecasts in response to new market information, and likewise, whether the market updates
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dividend expectations in response to analyst forecast revisions. I answer this question using a more
direct proxy of market expectations than previous studies such as Dhillon et al. (2003). My method,
using option put-call parity is developed in the first thesis chapter Guerrero (2017), and extended
from Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992). Extending a concept in Baginski and Hassell (1990), that analysts
play a role in interpreting the quality of information produced by management revisions and other
sources, I find evidence that superior analysts are more likely to update their dividend forecasts in
response to changes in the market information about the expected dividend. Non-superior analysts
are less likely to increase their forecasts in response to increases in the market expectations of the
dividend. However, unlike previous studies4 that find a market response to earnings revisions, I find
no evidence for a option market response to analyst dividend forecast revisions. This result is likely
due to the lower accuracy of individual analyst dividend forecasts compared with option-implied
dividends. The absence of a market response indicates that option market participants have already
incorporated into their prices superior information about the upcoming dividend compared with the
information available to individual analysts.
The second focus of this paper investigates whether option-implied, superior analysts, non-superior,
or consensus analysts provide more precise forecasts of firm dividends. Researchers can better test
dividend signalling theories, and value-relevancy of accounting measures, by calculating a dividend
surprise measure using a more precise forecast of market expectations of the dividend. Analysts, in-
vestors, and industry can also calculate stock prices that are closer to fundamental value when they
use more precise dividend forecasts as inputs in their models. I find that dividends implied by option
prices provide a more precise forecast of future dividends than individual analyst and superior analyst
forecasts but are not more accurate than the mean consensus dividend forecast. Barker (1999) find
that analysts primarily use Price Earnings and Dividend Yield in their valuation models. My results
indicate that investors and analysts could use option-implied dividends to inform their own dividend
forecasts, increasing the accuracy of the dividend yield used as an input in their stock and derivative
valuation models.
My results create the opportunity for future research on the stock price reaction to changes in
analyst and option-implied dividend forecasts, the option-implied dividend reaction to management
revisions, and the effect of dividend payout policy on analyst forecast accuracy and option prices.
4(Gleason and Lee, 2003; Park and Stice, 2000)
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TABLE 3.1: Frequency distributions for the number of individual put-call pairs by the degree to which the options are in-the-money (S/X) and by the time
to expiration of the options, (T ).
Ratio of stock price to exercise price Number of transactions Percent Time to expiration in weeks Number of transactions Percent
S/X < 0.75 4,076 0.32% T < 2 18,518 1.45%
0.75 ≤ S/X < 0.8 5,352 0.42% 2 ≤ T < 4 138,884 10.85%
0.8 ≤ S/X < 0.85 11,719 0.92% 4 ≤ T < 6 105,863 8.27%
0.85 ≤ S/X < 0.9 29,254 2.29% 6 ≤ T < 8 67,904 5.31%
0.9 ≤ S/X < 0.95 75,390 5.89% 8 ≤ T < 10 56,635 4.43%
0.95 ≤ S/X < 1 205,432 16.05% 10 ≤ T < 12 100,366 7.84%
1 ≤ S/X < 1.05 441,822 34.53% 12 ≤ T < 14 199,503 15.59%
1.05 ≤ S/X < 1.1 254,331 19.88% 14 ≤ T < 16 127,494 9.96%
1.1 ≤ S/X < 1.15 123,202 9.63% 16 ≤ T < 18 135,112 10.56%
1.15 ≤ S/X < 1.2 58,304 4.56% 18 ≤ T < 20 80,806 6.32%
1.2 ≤ S/X < 1.25 29,932 2.34% 20 ≤ T < 22 136,372 10.66%
1.25 ≤ S/X < 1.3 15,757 1.23% 22 ≤ T < 24 89,566 7.00%
1.3 ≤ S/X < 1.35 9,289 0.73% 24 ≤ T < 26 16,330 1.28%
1.35 ≤ S/X < 1.4 5,574 0.44% 26 ≤ T < 28 2,327 0.18%
1.4 ≤ S/X < 1.45 3,362 0.26% 28 ≤ T < 30 1,310 0.10%
1.45 ≤ S/X < 1.5 1,767 0.14% 30 ≤ T < 32 1,174 0.09%
1.50 ≤ S/X 5,025 0.39% 32 ≤ T 1,424 0.11%
Total 1,279,588 100.00% Total 1,279,588 100.00%
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TABLE 3.2: Descriptive statistics for the Option-implied dividend surprise and analyst forecast revision
surprise.
Mean Std. dev.
Dividend Yield 1.0835% 0.010409
Yield change -0.1306% 0.031609
Firms 453
Analysts 689
Superior analysts (at least one firm) 302
Dividend events 1857
Obs. dividend increased 30.05%
Obs. dividend unchanged or decreased 70.17%
All analysts IDIVSP FR IDIVFR FR
Increased 49.96% 49.18% 50.59% 48.21%
Unchanged or decreased 50.04% 50.82% 49.41% 51.79%
n=3467 n=2985
Superior analysts IDIVSP FR IDIVFR FR
Increased 49.00% 64.70% 51.12% 64.25%
Unchanged or decreased 51.00% 35.30% 48.88% 35.75%
n=847 n=716
FR is the Forecast revision specific to either the IDIVFR or IDIVSP regressions.
An analyst is classed as superior for a specific firm if 80% or more of the analyst’s forecasts for that firm were closer
to realised earnings than was the I/B/E/S consensus forecast existing at the time the forecasts were given. In order
to qualify, as superior, the analyst must have provided at least four forecasts. In addition, the analyst must not be the
sole analyst in the consensus forecast.
Mean yield change is the mean of the change in dividend yield, that is Dt−1 − Dt/Pt, where Dt is the current
dividend at time t, Dt−1 is the previous dividend at time t−1, and Pt is the share price two days prior to the dividend
at time t.
The option-implied dividend forecast revision is IDIV FRit = IDIVit−IDIVirPi,t−2 where IDIVit is the mean option-
implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week preceding analyst revision at day t, IDIVir
is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week following the previous
ex-dividend day at time r, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast revision at
day t.
The analyst revision option-implied forecast surprise is IDIV SPit =
IDIVit−IDIVif
Pi,t−2
where IDIVit is the mean
option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week preceding analyst revision at day t,
IDIVif is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week following the
day after the analyst revision at day t, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast
revision at day t.
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TABLE 3.3: Mean prediction errors of Adjusted Option-Implied Dividends (IDIV A), Consensus Analyst
Dividend Forecast (CDIV ), Individual analysts (ADIV ), and Superior analysts (SDIV ).
No. of obs. Predictor MAPE MSPE
11,769 Option-implied 0.002021 0.000256
11,769 Consensus analyst 0.001028 0.000225
132,442 All analysts 0.002840 0.000882
35,463 Superior analysts 0.002290 0.000698
MAPE is the mean absolute prediction error, that is, MAPE = 1
n
∑n
j=1
|Djt−Fjt|
Pjx
where Djt is
the realized dividend amount for the jth stock at time t, Fj is the dividend forecast, for the jth
stock at time t, Pjx is the stock price two days before the ex-dividend date at time x, and n is the
number of observations for the year.
MSPE is the mean squared prediction error, that is MSPE = 1
n
∑n
j=1
(Djt−Fjt)2
Pjx
.
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TABLE 3.4: Dependent: Market revision IDIVSP dummy
Estimate Probability Std. Dev. Wald χ2 P-value
Intercept 0.0341 51.36% 0.0299 1.3071 0.2529
Forecast revision -0.0714 48.51% 0.0480 2.2084 0.1373
Forecast revision (Superior analysts) -0.00075 51.33% 0.0637 0.0001 0.9906
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and Covariates
AIC 4808.280 4809.449
SC 4814.431 4827.902
-2 Log L 4806.280 4803.449
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant 31.9 Somers’ D 0.029
Percent Discordant 29.1 Gamma 0.047
Percent Tied 39 Tau-a 0.014
Pairs 3005020 c 0.514
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0
Test χ2 p-Value
Likelihood Ratio 2.8311 0.2428
Score 2.8307 0.2428
Wald 2.8293 0.243
An analyst is classed as superior for a specific firm if 80% or more of the analyst’s forecasts for that firm were closer
to realised earnings than was the I/B/E/S consensus forecast existing at the time the forecasts were given. In order
to qualify, as superior, the analyst must have provided at least four forecasts. In addition, the analyst must not be the
sole analyst in the consensus forecast.
The option-implied dividend forecast revision is IDIV FRit = IDIVit−IDIVirPi,t−2 where IDIVit is the mean option-
implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week preceding analyst revision at day t, IDIVir
is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week following the previous
ex-dividend day at time r, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast revision at
day t.
The analyst revision option-implied forecast surprise is IDIV SPit =
IDIVit−IDIVif
Pi,t−2
where IDIVit is the mean
option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week preceding analyst revision at day t,
IDIVif is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week following the
day after the analyst revision at day t, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast
revision at day t.
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TABLE 3.5: Dependent: Forecast revision dummy
Estimate Probability Std. Dev. Wald χ2 P-value
Intercept -0.0502 48.00% 0.0326 2.3598 0.1245
Market revision -0.1357 42.63% 0.0499 7.4048 0.0065
Market revision (Superior analysts) 0.5701 69.84% 0.0752 57.4187 < .0001
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and Covariates
AIC 4136.252 4081.757
SC 4142.254 4099.761
-2 Log L 4134.252 4075.757
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant 36.5 Somers’ D 0.128
Percent Discordant 23.7 Gamma 0.212
Percent Tied 39.7 Tau-a 0.064
Pairs 2224694 c 0.564
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0
Test χ2 p-Value
Likelihood Ratio 58.4954 < .0001
Score 57.9389 < .0001
Wald 57.4447 < .0001
An analyst is classed as superior for a specific firm if 80% or more of the analyst’s forecasts for that firm were closer
to realised earnings than was the I/B/E/S consensus forecast existing at the time the forecasts were given. In order
to qualify, as superior, the analyst must have provided at least four forecasts. In addition, the analyst must not be the
sole analyst in the consensus forecast.
The option-implied dividend forecast revision is IDIV FRit = IDIVit−IDIVirPi,t−2 where IDIVit is the mean option-
implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week preceding analyst revision at day t, IDIVir
is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week following the previous
ex-dividend day at time r, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast revision at
day t.
The analyst revision option-implied forecast surprise is IDIV SPit =
IDIVit−IDIVif
Pi,t−2
where IDIVit is the mean
option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week preceding analyst revision at day t,
IDIVif is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded during the week following the
day after the analyst revision at day t, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the analyst forecast
revision at day t.
4
Insider Trading and Option-Implied Dividend
Surprises
4.1 Introduction
Insider trading relates to board members and executives trading in the securities of their own com-
pany. Analysis of insider trades surrounding firm information releases is important because it gives
us greater understanding of market efficiency. Studies, such as Jaffe (1974); Seyhun (1986), show
that insider trading enhances the informational efficiency of the market. This analysis extends to firm
dividend announcements, such as Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988), who investigates insider trad-
ing prior to dividend cessation or resumption and finds that insiders trade and earn abnormal returns
based on their superior knowledge of dividend changes. In addition, insider trading serves a signal-
ing purpose to corroborate the quality of earnings surrounding dividend announcements. Trading by
insiders, prior to announcements of dividend initiations, indicates to the market that management has
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confidence in future dividends and the sustainability of earnings (John and Lang, 1991).
Past studies, on dividends and insider trading, have used dividend resumptions and initiations or
a naive model, that is, using the most recent dividend as the expected future dividend. In this chapter,
I investigate whether insiders trade stock or options using their superior knowledge of changes in
the amount of their firm’s dividend payments. I am able to capture a more complete measure of
dividend surprise by using the market expectations of dividends implied by option prices. As per the
methodology in the previous chapter, an extension of Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992), I use the dividends
implied by American option prices as a proxy for market expectations of dividends. I then use these
expectations to calculate a dividend surprise and investigate whether there is abnormal insider trading
preceding these dividend surprises. There are two advantages to my approach. Firstly, past studies
have included only firms that cease or resume dividends, however these firms are a very small subset
of all dividend paying firms. Using option-implied dividend changes I can include all dividend paying
stocks with a liquid options market. Secondly, changes in the option-implied dividend provide a more
accurate measure of dividend surprise than a naive change1. I also extend past papers by considering
the hierarchy of insider classification. By aggregating the sample based on the hierarchy of insiders,
I am also able to test for evidence of the information hierarchy hypothesis2, that more senior insiders
are more likely to trade on their superior knowledge, or the alternative, the scrutiny hypothesis3, that
more senior insiders are less likely to trade due to the possibility of shareholder or SEC actions.
Consistent with previous signaling studies4, I find that CEOs are more likely to accumulate stock
preceding an announcement for an expected increase in the cash dividend. Whereas, insiders lower
in the information hierarchy such as Non-Director Executives and Other Officers and Block-holders
are more likely to accumulate stock for an unexpected increase in the cash dividend. Directors, who
are also lower on the information hierarchy, were less likely to accumulate stock for an unexpected
increase in the dividend. I attribute the difference, between Directors versus Non-Director Executives
and Other Officers, to board membership acting as an additional burden of scrutiny. These results
support the scrutiny hypothesis of Fidrmuc et al. (2006). The findings are important because non-
board insiders appear to benefit from insider knowledge about dividend policy but do not provide the
signaling effect to markets such as when CEOs trade prior to dividend announcements5. It is possible
1Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992)
2Seyhun (1986)
3Fidrmuc et al. (2006)
4John and Lang (1991)
5John and Lang (1991)
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that firms could better align market dividend expectations with insider knowledge by improving cor-
porate governance policies such as long-term dividend policy transparency or implementing trading
windows, between announcement and ex-dividend date, for non-board insiders.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 contains a discussion of the theoretical and empirical
literature on insider trading and dividends implied by options. The section is divided into insider
superior earnings knowledge and returns, market responses to insider trades, information hierarchy,
block-holders, insider trading and dividends, and option implied dividends. Section 2 outlines my
method of estimating the dividend implied from American option transaction prices, and the insider
trading data sources and models. Section 3 presents the results, analysis and discussion. Section 4
summarizes the chapter and provides directions for future research.
4.1.1 Insider trading profits
Superior knowledge and returns
Early studies using U.S. data find that insiders earn abnormal returns on their trades (Jaffe, 1974;
Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986). Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) finds that insiders are
better informed about their firm’s prospects than outside investors and the market is slow at adjusting
to insider signals. However, studies conflict on whether outsiders can profit from trading on insider
signals. Some studies, such as Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988), show that outsiders do
not benefit by imitating insiders. Whereas other studies, such as Bettis, Vickrey, and Vickrey (1997),
show that investors can earn abnormal profits by trading on large insider trades by top executives.
Many studies investigate whether insiders trade on their superior knowledge of future earnings.
They find no evidence, between 20 days and 12 months, of a significant change in buying or selling
preceding a change in earnings (Elliott, Morse, and Richardson, 1984; Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Noe,
1999). Insiders possibly avoid trading close to earnings announcements due to the risk of prosecution
either from the SEC or from civil class actions (Seyhun, 1992). However, other studies such as
Noe (1999) have examined insider trades over longer periods such as 12 months to 5 years and find
some evidence that insiders trade and profit from changes in long term earnings growth. It’s possible
that insiders trade on short term dividend surprises due to their control over dividend policy and the
reduced attention from regulators compared with insider trades surrounding earnings.
Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) look at insider trades preceding a break in a string of quarterly
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earnings increases over a window of up to 16 quarters before the break. The share price reaction
is larger for a break following many quarters of earnings growth and this provides insiders with a
strong motivation to sell prior to this event. Prior studies have shown this effect should be larger
for growth stocks than value stocks (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). The results from Ke et al. (2003)
show that insiders attempt to avoid negative implications from SEC enforcement and class actions by
selling stocks well before the event: 3 to 9 quarters before a break in a string of earnings growth. The
study also finds that insider selling increases incrementally if firm-quarters are for growth firms as
indicated in Skinner and Sloan (2002). It also increases if the break in earnings growth is longer or
if the earnings decline is larger. This implies that insiders trade on their superior knowledge of the
quality of future earnings. Ke et al. (2003) contributes to the literature by showing how insiders reveal
their knowledge of future earnings breaks by trading further out from the event.
Insiders are more likely to be contrarian (Seyhun, 1992). Because earnings announcements often
accompany actual changes in performance, it leaves open the question of whether insiders are trading
on investor errors in valuation or because of the insiders superior knowledge about the firms future
cash flows. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) investigates this issue by comparing the relative strength
of contrarian trading versus beliefs about future cash flow news and realisations. Results from Pi-
otroski and Roulstone (2005) show strong evidence that insider purchases are positively related to
future earnings performance and positively related to BM ratios and inversely related to past returns.
However, superior information about future cash-flow changes explain a smaller portion of insider
purchase activities than misvaluation. They also shows that insider purchases have stronger correla-
tion with current and future earnings in firms with higher information asymmetry such as small firms
that are poorly followed by analysts.
Market response to insider trades
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examine the information content of insider trades and the best way to
interpret insider signals. 55% of firms in their sample have purchasing or selling by insiders and
72% for larger firms. As expected, insider sales as a portion of the firms market capitalisation are
larger at 1.3% than purchases of 0.6% possibly because insiders are remunerated in stock options
and sell more than they purchase for non-information liquidity motivations such as requiring cash or
diversification. During the sample period of 1975-1995 insider purchases had no material increase.
The study also finds that the market tends to ignore reported insider activities; abnormal returns
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around the reporting dates of insider trades are not economically meaningful. However, abnormal
returns around the trading dates were relatively large. The main contribution of Lakonishok and Lee
(2001) is that whilst insider trades earn abnormal earnings, the markets response to disclosure of these
trades is insignificant.
Information hierarchy
Seyhun (1986) studies insider trades from 1975 to 1981 and finds that chairman of the board and direc-
tors are more successful predictors of abnormal stock prices than officers and shareholders. Whereas,
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) extend tests of the information hierarchy hypothesis by examining trades by
different levels of insiders, different types of announcements, and the effect of ownership. They are
unable to find evidence that supports the information hierarchy, instead they find that CEO trades have
a lower information content than other directors’ trades. They suggest this is due to CEOs, having a
more important position in the firm than other insiders, trading more cautiously due to greater market
scrutiny. They also detail the difference between the US and UK insider trading regulatory environ-
ments. They are able to compare UK insider trades with the results from US insider trades presented
in Lakonishok and Lee (2001). Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find CAAR to be higher in the UK compared
with the US (from Lakonishok and Lee (2001) possibly because of speedier reporting and because UK
directors trade less frequently due to trading bans and therefore have higher information content when
they do trade. The study also finds that insider purchases likely convey positive information about a
firm’s prospects whereas insider sales may also be liquidity motivated which would decrease the in-
formation value of the trade. They find that director purchases and sales trigger significant immediate
market reactions of 3.12% and 0.37%, respectively, over a 2-day window from announcement day.
Insider trading and dividends
Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988) investigate insider trades prior to firms announcing the cessation
of dividend payments or the resumption of dividend payments after two years of non-payment. They
find that insiders increase their purchases before the resumption of dividend payments. However, they
fail to find evidence that insiders earn positive abnormal returns from purchases but find that they earn
positive abnormal returns from sales.
Looking at the context of simultaneous information releases, Cheng and Leung (2008) examine
insider trading before simultaneous earnings and dividend announcements in Hong Kong. They find
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significant net-insider-buying activities before announcements of good news (’Earnings-Dividend In-
crease’) and significant net-insider-selling activities before bad news (’Earnings-Dividend Decrease’
and ’Earnings Decrease-Dividend Zero’). Extending this work, Cheng, Davidson, and Leung (2011)
find greater information asymmetry for simultaneous bad news earnings-dividend announcements
with insider sales than good news earnings-dividend announcements with insider purchases. These
results strengthen the likelihood of finding insider trading preceding dividend surprises implied by
option prices.
Tanimura and Wehrly (2012) provides additional support for the incentives for the scrutiny hy-
pothesis put forward by Fidrmuc et al. (2006), they study the effects of two regimes of insider trading
restrictions on insider trades around dividend initiations and omissions between 1935 and 1974. They
find that insiders sold less frequently and made less profits under the increased adjudicative approach
of the SEC. These studies provide tension with the information hierarchy hypothesis put forward by
Seyhun (1986).
4.1.2 Option implied dividends
Past research has investigated whether insider trading activity is abnormal preceding dividend an-
nouncements and whether insiders earn abnormal profits following these trades. The change of
expectations that these studies have used when a firm resumes paying dividends after a period of
non-payment or the cessation of dividends following a period of dividend payments. These all or
nothing dividend changes may not generalise to the much more common case of a moderate increase
or decrease in the amount of dividend paid. Derivatives can be used to extract a market expectation
of the implied dividend. Announced changes that differ from the market expectations should cause a
change in the pricing of the securities. Insiders may purchase more stock when they expect an upward
revision in the market expectation of dividends following an announcement of an increased dividend
or when that information becomes available to the market after their trade. In the following section
I detail the method used in Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992) to calculate a measure of dividend surprise
using American options.
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4.2 Methodology and data
First, I estimate the market expectations of the ex-dividend day drop from the option and stock data.
Second, I develop a measure of dividend surprise by calculating the change in option-implied dividend
expectations. Third, I calculate measures of different insider trading activities preceding dividend
announcements. Finally, I regress the dividend surprise on the insider trading activities and present
the results.
4.2.1 Estimation of the option-implied dividend forecasts
In the first thesis chapter, Guerrero (2017), I expand on a methodology developed by Bae-Yosef
and Sarig (1992) to estimate option market dividend expectations. I use changes in option-implied
dividend as a proxy for dividend surprise. Expected dividends are calculated using option put-call
parity; the following equation holds for European options:
PV (DIV ) = S − (c− p+KBt) (4.1)
where PV (DIV ) is the current value of expected interim dividends; S, c, and p are the prices of the
underlying stock, the European call, and the European put, respectively; K is the common exercise
price; and Bt is the time-t price of a pure discount bond maturing on the options’ common expiration
day.
Equation 4.1 is based on European option prices. Since I can only observe American options, I
need to take into account the premium due to the right of early exercise. I define the American over
European option premium, for calls and puts, by:
∆c ≡ C − c ≥ 0 (4.2)
∆p ≡ P − p ≥ 0 (4.3)
where C and P are American call and put prices, respectively. Equation 4.1 can now be written as
PV (DIV ) = S − (c+ ∆c− (p+ ∆p) +KBt) (4.4)
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American options will not be exercised early, and therefore have an equivalent price to European
options, whenever:
D ≤ K(1− e−R(T−t)) (4.5)
where D is the dividend, R is the forward rate between the dividend payout time, t, and the expiration
date, T, as observed at time t, and K is the exercise price of the option.
My estimation procedure matches the two closest observations, based on time, where a put and
call with the same exercise price and expiration date occur on the same day. Transactions are only
matched to a single pair but there may exist many pairs on any given day. I find 80,898 put-call trade
pairs, approximately 8.37% of the original sample, meet the condition in equation 4.5 and I use a
modified equation 4.1 to calculate the future value of the dividend, for these transactions:
IDIV =
(
S − C + P −K exp (−R(TM − t))) exp (R(TX − t)) (4.6)
where IDIV is the future value, at the ex-dividend day TX , of the cash dividend, C, P , K are the
call, put, and strike prices, S is the mean of stock trade prices that occur between the put-call pair,
TM is the time of maturity, and R is the forward rate.
American call options that do not meet the condition in equation 4.5 will be exercised the day
before the ex-dividend date due to the expected stock price decline. Whereas, American put options
that do not meet the the condition in 4.5 will be exercised on or after the ex-dividend date depending
on moneyness. If the interest on the proceeds from early exercise exceed the time value of money
then early exercise is optimal:
(K − S)(1− e−R(T−t)) > T.V. (4.7)
where T.V. is the time value of the option, and the remaining notation is the same as equation 4.5.
Based on the expected price decline due to the dividend, I anticipate an insignificant marginal differ-
ence in the European vs American put option premium.67 Therefore, for the main study, the remaining
option pairs that do not satisfy equation 4.5 are estimated using equation 4.6 with the maturity date
TM set to the ex-dividend date TX due to early exercise.
6Gray (1989) finds in favour of put-call parity holding when taking into account the potential rational early exercise
of an option and the possibility that dividends and capitalisation changes will differ from expectations.
7Whaley (1982) finds only a half-percent difference in pricing between European and American options.
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Mean option-implied dividend forecasts are denoted IDIV .
4.2.2 Option-implied dividend surprise
In order to answer the question of whether insiders trade on their superior knowledge of future div-
idends, I need to measure the change in the market’s expectations of the dividend amount due to the
information release of the dividend announcement by the firm. The measure I use is the change in the
mean estimate from before to after the dividend announcement. Therefore, I define the option-implied
dividend surprise as:
IDIV SPit =
IDIVia − IDIVib
Pi,t−2
(4.8)
where IDIVib is the mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded prior to
the dividend announcement on day t but after the previous ex-dividend day Exdiv−1, IDIVia is the
mean option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded after the dividend announcement
on day t up until the day before the ex-dividend day Exdiv0, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm
i two days before the dividend announcement at day t.
FIGURE 4.1: Option-implied dividend surprise measure timeline
Exdiv−1 t Exdiv0
IDIVib IDIVia
4.2.3 Measures of insider trading activity
I use the net purchase ratio, as per (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), as the measure of insider trading
activity, that is,
NPRit =
PURCHASESit
PURCHASESit + SALESit
(4.9)
where NPRit is the insider net purchase ratio for firm i for insider trades between the previous
ex-dividend day and the announcement at day t for the current upcoming dividend, PURCHASESit
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and SALESit are, respectively, the sum of insider purchases and the sum of insider sales between the
previous ex-dividend date and the announcement at day t for firm i.
FIGURE 4.2: Net Purchase Ratio timeline
Exdiv−1 t
Insider trades
I use the option exercise ratio, as the measure of option exercise activity by insiders, that is,
OERit =
EXERCISEPURCHASESit
PURCHASESit + SALESit
(4.10)
where OERit is the option exercise ratio for firm i for insider trades between the previous ex-
dividend day and the announcement at day t for the current upcoming dividend,EXERCISEPURCHASESit,
PURCHASESit and SALESit are, respectively, the sum of purchases from exercising options, the
sum of insider purchases, and the sum of insider sales between the previous ex-dividend date and the
announcement at day t for firm i.
4.2.4 Do insiders increase their purchases if there is a dividend surprise?
Earlier work by Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988), find that insiders increase their purchases before
the resumption of dividends after two years of non-payment. Likewise, I expect this affect to hold for
unexpected changes in the dividend amount.
In addition, Seyhun (1986) find that CEO and chairman have trades that reveal a higher informa-
tion content than insiders lower in the information hierarchy. Alternatively, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find
that insiders higher in the firm hierarchy shy away from trading on their superior knowledge, possibly
due to the higher scrutiny by shareholders and exchange regulators. I can test whether insiders act on
their knowledge or trade when they have less scrutiny by formalising the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Insiders higher in the information hierarchy are more likely to accumulate stock, than
insiders lower in the hierarchy, when there is a positive dividend surprise.
In the previous thesis chapter, Guerrero (2017), I find that the option-implied dividend is a noisy
measure of the expected dividend due to transaction costs, moneyness of the options, thin-trading,
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non-synchronous trading, and dividend yield. I use a latent variable model and probit regressions
as I am primarily interested in the likelihood of a change in either the market prices or the analyst
forecasts, and not necessarily in a linear relationship. Consider the latent variable model,
y∗i = x
′
iβ + i (4.11)
where y∗i is an unobservable latent variable that measures the accumulation of stock by insiders, xi is
a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters and i is a random disturbance
term. I assume that y∗i is related to the observed variable yi, in the following way,
y =
1, if y
∗
i > 0
0, otherwise
(4.12)
I can see whether insiders increase their net purchases of their stock by trading on their superior
knowledge of their firm’s upcoming dividend change by regressing the option-implied dividend sur-
prise on the measure of insider trading activity. Therefore, I estimate the following probit model,
NPRit = γ0 + γ1NAIV ESPit ∗ IDIV SPit ∗ROLEit + γ2NAIV ESPit ∗ROLEit + j (4.13)
whereNPRit has a value of 1 when the insider net purchase ratio defined in equation 4.9 is greater
than 0.5 and a value of 0 otherwise, IDIV SPit has a value of 1 when the option-implied dividend
surprise defined in equation 4.8 is positive and a value of 0 otherwise, NAIV ESPit has a value
of 1 when the dividend at time t is greater than the previous dividend and a value of 0 otherwise,
and ROLEit is a categorical dummy variable that represents the position within the firm, that is,
Chairman, CEO, Directors, Executive Directors, Former Officers, and Other Executives.
4.2.5 Do insiders exercise their options if there is a dividend surprise?
Insiders may not increase their net purchases prior to a change in the dividend announcement due
to public scrutiny of their stock purchases. However, exercisement of their existing option holdings
may not attract as much attention from shareholders and regulators. The value of the options will be
affected to a greater extent by the ex-dividend day decline, than stock, because options do not receive
the cash dividend unless exercised early.
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Likewise, I can extend the tests of the information hypothesis (Seyhun, 1986) vs. scrutiny hypoth-
esis (Fidrmuc et al., 2006) to option disposition. I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Insiders higher in the information hierarchy are more likely than insiders lower in the
hierarchy to dispose of options, when there is a positive dividend surprise.
We can infer whether insiders exercise their options prior to an unexpected increase in dividends
by regressing the option-implied dividend surprise on the measure of insider option exercise. There-
fore, I estimate a similar probit model as equation 4.14,
OERit = γ0 + γ1NAIV ESPit ∗ IDIV SPit ∗ROLEit + γ2NAIV ESPit ∗ROLEit + j (4.14)
where OERit has a value of 1 when the insider option exercise ratio defined in equation 4.10 is
greater than 0.5, and the other variables are defined, as above, in equation 4.14.
4.2.6 Data
The data in the chapter are compiled from three sources: OptionMetrics, Thomson Reuters Insider
Data, and Thomson Reuters Tick History.
Insider transactions
I use insider transaction data from Thomson Reuters for U.S. firms between 2009 and 2015. The data
are from Forms 3, 4, and 5. As per Lakonishok and Lee (2001), I exclude transactions with less than
100 shares to focus on the more meaningful events. The number of transactions less than 100 shares
is 34,437. I remove trades for which the number of shares traded exceed 20% of the number of shares
outstanding. There are 892 dividend-paying firms that are present in both the insider data and the
option tick data. The final sample includes 119,019 stock and 95,905 derivative transactions.
The analysis of stock accumulation includes transaction codes A, F, I, J, M, P, S, D. These codes
represent: Acquisition of a derivative or non-derivative security, payment of option exercise price or
tax liability by delivering or withholding securities incident to exercise of a derivative security, Dis-
cretionary transaction in accordance with Rule 16b-3(F) - typically employee benefit plans, Exercise
of in-the-money or at-the-money derivative security in accordance with Rule 16b - typically employee
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benefit plans, Open market purchase, Open market sale, Disposition of a derivative or non-derivative
security.
I include the following types of derivative securities: Call option, Non-employee director stock
option, Director’s stock option, Employee stock option, Options. The option disposition analysis
includes transaction codes C, D, I, J, M, O, S, X. These codes represent: Conversion of a derivative
security, Disposition of a derivative or non-derivative security, Discretionary transaction in accordance
with Rule 16b-3(F) - typically employee benefit plans, Other acquisition or disposition, Exercise of
in-the-money or at-the-money derivative security in accordance with Rule 16b - typically employee
benefit plans, Exercise of out-of-the-money derivative security, Open market sale, Exercise of in-the-
money or at-the-money derivative security.
The insider purchases and sales, by firm and by dividend quarter, for the final sample are sum-
marized in Table 2. The number of net purchases and sales are very similar at 53,032 and 65,275
respectively. CEOs made significantly more purchases (4,882) and sales (8,381) than Chairman with
531 purchases and 661 sales. This could be because I categorize an insider as a CEO if they are both
a CEO and a Chairman. The median market capitalization of the trades appear to decrease monotoni-
cally, from 0.0334% for CEOs through to 0.0126% for Officers and beneficial holders. The pattern of
decreasing market capitalization of trade size with decreasing position within the firm appears to gen-
erally hold for sales, with CEOs at 0.0226% through to Officers and beneficial holders at 0.0097%. It
could be argued that Non-director executives and Non-executive directors have a similar level within
the firm hierarchy but the executives are more likely to receive larger option packages and vested
shares than their non-executive director counterparts.
Option data
Using end-of-day data and dividend event data from OptionMetrics, I compile a list of firm-years that
match the following filter: at least a single daily traded volume of 30 for an option instrument with a
single ex-dividend date between the trade date and option maturity. Using these firm-years, I collect
all option and underlying stock tick data from Thomson Reuters Tick History from 2009-2015. The
final sample consists of 9,334 firm-years from 1,908 firms.
I exclude dividend events where the stock price moves more than 10% from the close the day
before the ex-dividend date to the opening on the ex-dividend date. I exclude, due to the unavailability
of future dividend event information, option maturities with expiration past the dividend event sample
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period of 31st December 2015. I exclude estimated dividend yields greater than 10%. This reduces
the sample approximately 0.01% from 4,818,361 to 4,817,818 individual estimates.
I truncate at the 2nd and 98th percentiles for the individual dividend estimates, implied alpha , and
overnight realized alpha. This reduces the sample by approximately 10.6% to 4,303,528 individual
estimates. After I match the individual estimates with insider trading records, the final sample of indi-
vidual dividend estimates reduces to 3,009,020. I then calculate the mean of the individual estimates
for each dividend event and use these values in the following analysis.
The ratio of the stock price to exercise price and the time in weeks to expiration are detailed in
Table 1. 84.92% of the transactions have a S/X ratio within 0.9 to 1.1. Most of these transactions
are within-the-money. The largest category of time to maturity is between four and six weeks with
762,226 option pairs. 91.66% of option pairs are less than 14 weeks.
Naive changes in dividends and the option-implied dividend surprises are summarized in Table 3.
The pre-announcement and post-announcement means of 0.8398 and 0.8953, respectively, are both
very close to the means of expected drop in the first thesis chapter of 0.871584 for all observations
and 0.850048 for the filtered sample. The mean naive change in dividend over this time period for the
sample is negative at -0.0700%. Likewise, the option-implied dividend surprise also has a negative
mean of -0.0381%. The median naive change in dividend is 0% because more than half of the div-
idend events include no change in the dividend paid. As expected, I see a reduction in the standard
deviation of the implied dividend, from 0.3889 pre-announcement to 0.3059 post-announcement, due
to the increased certainty of the dividend amount.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Stock trading
Do insiders acquire or dispose stock prior to a dividend change?
The results from Table 4 show a significant increased probability (0.4151) for CEOs to engage in
stock accumulation in the prior inter-dividend period when the increase is known to the market. No
other classification of insider has a significant estimate. As CEOs are the most influential insiders for
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determining dividend payout policy, the accumulation of stock for a known dividend increase signals
to the market the CEO’s confidence in the sustainability of the dividend and therefore the cash flows
of the firm8.
The results for an unexpected increase in dividend, implied by option prices, gives a negative sig-
nificant estimate (-0.2315) for Directors, indicating they are less likely to accumulate stock. However,
Non-board Executives (0.1955) and Other insiders (0.0848) have a positive probability of accumu-
lating stock given an unexpected increase in dividend. Putting aside for the moment the result from
Directors, the increased stock accumulation for the later two classifications do not support Hypoth-
esis 1. Instead, this result supports the alternative hypothesis put forward by Fidrmuc et al. (2006)
that insiders lower in the hierarchy are less likely to be noticed and prosecuted for trading on private
knowledge. One possible explanation for the difference between the Director versus the Non-board
Executives and Other insider estimates is that Directors’ presence on the board means they have a
higher level of scrutiny by shareholders and the SEC than non-board insiders. Various case law such
as Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 198 (1988), set out duties of directors in a business such as to “act
in the best interests of the corporation” and “not involve self-interest”. Directors have a Duty of Care
and Duty of Loyalty that do not burden non-directors, and this could be a possible explanation for these
results. The insignificance of an estimate for Executive Directors could be due to a lack of power, as
the number of observations is much lower at 541 compared with Directors at 2,229, Non-board Ex-
ecutives at 3,971, and Other Block-holders at 2,914 observations. However, the lack of a significant
estimate for Executive Directors does not detract from the support for the board-membership explana-
tion given previously. Overall, the result seems to support the scrutiny hypothesis of (Fidrmuc et al.,
2006) that insiders higher (lower) in the firm hierarchy are less (more) likely to act on their private
information due to higher (lower) scrutiny of their actions by shareholders and regulators.
4.3.2 Option exercise
Do insiders exercise options prior to a dividend change?
Similar to the analysis in the previous section, results for an expected change in dividend are presented
first. Table 5 reveals a significantly negative estimate for CEO (-0.1930) and Other Block-holders (-
0.1137), indicating that they are less likely to exercise their options prior to an expected increase in
8John and Lang (1991)
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dividends. However, Directors have a significantly positive estimate (0.5448) and are more likely
to exercise their options prior to an expected increase in dividends. I expected that insiders would
exercise their options prior to the announcement given an expected increase in cash dividend decreases
the value of their option. The result from CEO and Other Block-holders is inconsistent with this
intuition and I’m unable to explain this result.
The significant estimates for an unexpected increase in dividend indicate that Directors (-0.2352)
are less likely to exercise their options. Directors hold a lower position within the firm and I expect
that they are less likely to know about the likelihood of an increase in dividends, and the quality of
the dividend with regard to future earnings, before a vote by the board of directors. However, Non-
board Executives and Other Block-holders are also low within the information hierarchy but have
an increased probability (0.1955) and (0.0848), respectively, of exercising their options prior to an
unexpected increase in dividends. The result is consistent with the stock accumulation results in the
previous section. This provides further evidence that there is a possible difference in market and
regulatory scrutiny between the trades of low information hierarchy insiders who are on the board of
the firm compared with insiders who are not on the board.
The results for option disposition are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 and favour the alternative, the
Scrutiny Hypothesis put forward by Fidrmuc et al. (2006). Non-board executives and block-holders
are too low in the firm’s hierarchy to support the information hypothesis put forward by Seyhun
(1986). The results, are possibly different to Seyhun (1986) due to the increased regulatory and
litigatory environment since the late 1970s sample period used in that study.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate whether insiders accumulate stock, or exercise their options, based on
their superior knowledge of changes in the firm dividend policy. If a category of insider is more likely
to trade prior to a dividend surprise then I conclude that the insider is trading on upcoming dividend
information that is not yet available to the market. I calculate a measure of dividend surprise, using the
option put-call method from the prior chapter which is an extension of Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992).
Estimating dividends from option prices has an advantage over using the naive-change in dividend
because the estimates incorporate information that is available to the market prior to the dividend
announcement by the firm. The measures of insider trading activity are two binary variables based on
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whether or not the category of insider has accumulated stock and whether they have exercised options
over the last quarter prior to the dividend announcement.
Consistent with past studies such as Fidrmuc et al. (2006), the results indicate that insiders who
are low in the information-hierarchy and not on the board of directors are more likely to engage in
stock accumulation and option exercise than board directors and senior management. Acknowledge-
ment that low hierarchy insiders are accumulating stock and disposing of options prior to dividend
surprises will enable firms to develop appropriate corporate governance policies on dividend policy
transparency and insider trading windows.
Future research could consider the sustainability of the dividend increase and the effect of in-
creased cash-flows on insider accumulation and option exercise. Another promising extension is
whether there is a difference, on insider accumulation, if the dividend is paid out of firm debt or cash
reserves. It’s possible that the capital structure of the firm could also have an effect on the level of
capital expenditure for new projects and this, in turn, could affect the long term growth of the firm.
It’s possible that the insider classifications with insignificant estimates may become significant when
the above factors are incorporated in a future analysis. A natural extension of this study could also
examine the holding period returns of insiders and the economic impact of the trading.
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TABLE 1: Frequency distributions for the number of individual put-call pairs by the degree to which the options are in-the-money (S/X) and by the time to
expiration of the options, (T ).
Ratio of stock price to exercise price No. of transactions Percent Time to expiration in weeks No. of transactions Percent
S/X < 0.75 2,378 0.08% T < 2 117,924 3.92%
0.75 ≤ S/X < 0.8 3,733 0.12% 2 ≤ T < 4 528,319 17.56%
0.8 ≤ S/X < 0.85 10,233 0.34% 4 ≤ T < 6 762,226 25.33%
0.85 ≤ S/X < 0.9 30,338 1.01% 6 ≤ T < 8 571,257 18.98%
0.9 ≤ S/X < 0.95 107,400 3.57% 8 ≤ T < 10 382,694 12.72%
0.95 ≤ S/X < 1 426,683 14.18% 10 ≤ T < 12 203,733 6.77%
1 ≤ S/X < 1.05 1,351,495 44.91% 12 ≤ T < 14 191,918 6.38%
1.05 ≤ S/X < 1.1 669,921 22.26% 14 ≤ T < 16 143,205 4.76%
1.1 ≤ S/X < 1.15 234,643 7.80% 16 ≤ T < 18 54,102 1.80%
1.15 ≤ S/X < 1.2 90,609 3.01% 18 ≤ T < 20 31,179 1.04%
1.2 ≤ S/X < 1.25 38,606 1.28% 20 ≤ T < 22 13,589 0.45%
1.25 ≤ S/X < 1.3 18,790 0.62% 22 ≤ T < 24 3,955 0.13%
1.3 ≤ S/X < 1.35 9,562 0.32% 24 ≤ T < 26 1,644 0.05%
1.35 ≤ S/X < 1.4 5,289 0.18% 26 ≤ T < 28 921 0.03%
1.4 ≤ S/X < 1.45 3,071 0.10% 28 ≤ T < 30 854 0.03%
1.45 ≤ S/X < 1.5 1,933 0.06% 30 ≤ T < 32 491 0.02%
1.50 ≤ S/X 4,336 0.14% 32 ≤ T 1,009 0.03%
Total 3,009,020 100.00% Total 3,009,020 100.00%
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TABLE 2: Stocks transactions, value, and market capitalization broken down by type of trader, Jan 2009 - Dec 2015.
Net purchases (53,032 trades) Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Trade value ($’000) 6,046,452 1,170,869 7,840,470,000 0
% Market capitalization 0.1592% 0.0306% 51.6004% 0.000008%
% Market capitalization by category of insider
CEO (4,882 trades) 0.0861% 0.0334% 6.7448% 0.000007%
Chairman (531 trades) 0.0740% 0.0274% 0.9192% 0.000083%
Executive Directors (1,705 trades) 0.0672% 0.0209% 3.3359% 0.000006%
Non-executive Directors (11,582 trades) 0.0774% 0.0065% 29.4507% 0.000001%
Non-director Executives (21,442 trades) 0.0378% 0.0159% 6.6743% 0.000008%
Officers and beneficial holders (12,890 trades) 0.1354% 0.0126% 40.3144% 0.000018%
Net sales (65,275 trades) Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Trade value ($’000) 1,270,363 125,664 3,643,720,000 614
% Market capitalization 0.2358% 0.0248% 57.7457% 0.000004%
% Market capitalization by category of insider
CEO (8,381 trades) 0.0674% 0.0226% 4.8988% 0.000022%
Chairman (661 trades) 0.0956% 0.0203% 2.4380% 0.000038%
Executive Directors (2,454 trades) 0.0683% 0.0152% 6.1334% 0.000006%
Non-executive Directors (9,711 trades) 0.1269% 0.0059% 33.0110% 0.000004%
Non-director Executives (27,020 trades) 0.0326% 0.0113% 13.8216% 0.000007%
Officers and beneficial holders (17,760 trades) 0.2740% 0.0097% 40.3144% 0.000023%
The above figures are aggregated transaction values by firm and insider classification for insider stock purchases and sales made between
ex-dividend dates.
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TABLE 3: Implied dividends as a proportion of actual dividends, Naive dividend surprise, and Option-implied dividend surprise as percentages of dividend
yield.
IDIV standardized by dividend amount Change in yield
Pre-announcement Post-announcement Implied surprise Naive surprise
Mean 0.8398 0.8953 -0.0381% -0.0700%
Median 0.8100 0.8707 -0.0260% 0.0000%
Std. dev. 0.3889 0.3059 0.002386 0.016092
Implied dividends are calculated as IDIV =
(
S − C + P −K exp (− R(TM − t))) exp (R(TX − t)) where IDIV is the future dividend
value, at the ex-dividend day TX , of the cash dividend, C, P , K are the call, put, and strike prices, S is the mean of stock trade prices that
occur between the put-call pair, TM is the time of maturity, and R is the forward rate.
The Implied dividend surprise is calculated as IDIV SPit = IDIVia−IDIVibPi,t−2 where IDIVib is the mean option-implied dividend per share for
firm i for options traded prior to the dividend announcement on day t but after the previous ex-dividend day Exdiv−1, IDIVia is the mean
option-implied dividend per share for firm i for options traded after the dividend announcement on day t up until the day before the ex-dividend
day Exdiv0, and Pi,t−2 is the price per share for firm i two days before the dividend announcement at day t.
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TABLE 4: Probit estimates of stock accumulation. Independent variable: binary stock accumulation. Dependent variables: binary naive dividend surprise
and option-implied dividend surprise.
Naive dividend surprise Option-implied dividend surprise
Position Obs Estimate Standard error Wald χ2 p-value Estimate Standard error Wald χ2 p-value
Chairman 190 -0.1472 0.2336 0.3969 0.5287 0.2637 0.5287 0.2487 0.6180
CEO 2159 0.4151 0.0808 26.4226 ≤ .0001 -0.0125 0.1238 0.0101 0.9198
Executive Director 541 0.2187 0.1307 2.8013 0.0942 0.2725 0.2475 1.2129 0.2708
Director 2299 -0.0289 0.0802 0.1299 0.7186 -0.2315 0.1164 3.9551 0.0467
Non-board Executive 3971 0.0469 0.0667 0.4940 0.4821 0.1955 0.0930 4.4163 0.0356
Other 2914 -0.0212 0.0476 0.1982 0.6562 0.0848 0.0131 41.6646 ≤ .0001
Joint Tests
Effect Wald χ2 p-value
Naive Dividend Surprise 33.893 ≤ .0001
Option-implied Dividend Surprise 9.8431 0.0732
The binary probit is a maximum likelihood estimation. The model includes a dummy variable for each firm position, a dummy variable
to indicate whether the firm’s dividend is higher than the previous dividend, and a dummy variable to indicate whether the option-implied
dividend surprise is positive.
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TABLE 5: Probit estimates of option disposition. Independent variable: binary option disposition. Dependent variables: binary naive dividend surprise and
option-implied dividend surprise.
Naive dividend surprise Option-implied dividend surprise
Position Obs Estimate Standard error Wald χ2 p-value Estimate Standard error Wald χ2 p-value
Chairman 48 (25%) -0.1439 0.2656 0.2934 0.5881 0.2757 0.5660 0.2372 0.6262
CEO 411 (19%) -0.1930 0.0893 4.6764 0.0306 -0.1567 0.1436 1.1908 0.2752
Executive Director 125 (23%) -0.1639 0.1471 1.2405 0.2654 -0.2573 0.2919 0.7769 0.3781
Director 923 (40%) 0.5448 0.0830 43.134 ≤ .0001 -0.2353 0.1168 4.0619 0.0439
Non-board Executive 1074 (27%) 0.1199 0.0718 2.789 0.0949 -0.1274 0.0998 1.6304 0.2016
Other 756 (26%) -0.1137 0.0520 4.7855 0.0287 -0.5841 0.0140 1750.7176 ≤ .0001
Joint Tests
Effect Wald χ2 p-value
Naive Dividend Surprise 69.5838 ≤ .0001
Option-implied Dividend Surprise 7.0031 0.2204
The binary probit is a maximum likelihood estimation. includes a dummy variable for each firm position, a dummy variable to indicate whether
the firm’s dividend is higher than the previous dividend, and a dummy variable to indicate whether the option-implied dividend surprise is
positive.
5
Conclusion
This thesis examines research questions in three different areas of finance using a method that calcu-
lates market expectations of dividends using put-call parity of American option prices. The research
questions cover the ex-dividend day drop and related option pricing errors; insider trading on superior
dividend knowledge; and analyst dividend forecast accuracy, incorporation of market information,
and market response to analyst revisions.
Ex-ante estimates of the dividend provide a cleaner expectation of the dividend drop because
they are not confounded by other pricing effects surrounding the ex-dividend date. This allows us to
calculate changes in the market expectation of the dividend and use an empirical instrument that more
closely measures the theoretical concept of the dividend surprise.
In the first chapter, I investigate the ex-dividend stock price decline implied by option transaction
prices. Contrary to past studies, such as Bae-Yosef and Sarig (1992), that have investigated option
prices, I find that the expected ex-dividend drop is significantly less than the cash dividend amount.
The second purpose of this chapter investigates factors that contribute to option mispricing. We find
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an increase in pricing errors of the implied dividend with thin trading, non-synchronous trading, and
lower dividend yields. We also find an increase in pricing errors for deep in-the-money and deep
out-of-the-money options and put-call pairs that are traded at opposing bid and ask combinations. I
demonstrate that option prices can be filtered based on these factors to improve the accuracy of option
prices that could potentially be used in implied volatility, risk neutral probability, or discount dividend
models.
The second chapter expands on the first by applying the same methodology to study the rela-
tionship between analyst dividend forecasts and market expectations of dividends implied by option
prices. The primary research question of this chapter is whether analysts update their forecasts in
response to new market information, and likewise, whether the market updates dividend expectations
in response to analyst forecast revisions. I find no evidence that supports a market reaction to either
non-superior or superior analysts. However, superior analysts update their dividend forecasts in re-
sponse to changes in market dividend forecasts. The second focus of this chapter investigates whether
option-implied, superior analysts, non-superior, or consensus analysts provide more precise forecasts
of firm dividends. The results show that dividends implied by option prices provide a more precise
forecast of future dividends than individual analyst and superior analyst forecasts but are not more
accurate than the mean consensus dividend forecast.
In the final chapter, I also apply the methodology from the first chapter to answer the question of
whether insiders trade stock or options using their superior knowledge, or control, of changes in the
amount of their firm’s dividend payments. Past studies, such as Oppenheimer and Dielman (1988),
investigate insider trading prior to dividend cessation or resumption and find that insiders trade and
earn abnormal returns based on their superior knowledge of dividend changes. I extend the naive
model, that assumes any change in dividend is a surprise to the market, by using the market expecta-
tions of dividends implied by option and stock prices. Consistent with the scrutiny hypothesis1, I find
evidence that insiders lower in the information hierarchy are more likely to accumulate stock prior
to a dividend surprise. There is also a difference between non-executive board directors and other
low hierarchy insiders that are not on the board. I attribute this additional scrutiny to director duties
and oversight. Whereas, consistent with the information hierarchy hypothesis2, those same low level
insiders are less likely to exercise their options prior to a dividend surprise.
This thesis uses a method for measuring ex-ante dividend expectations that only relies on liquid
1Fidrmuc et al. (2006)
2Seyhun (1986)
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option and stock prices. The three research areas investigated: option pricing, analysts, and insiders;
yield valuable results that have applications for applying option prices in asset pricing, the use and
interpretation of analyst dividend forecasts, and the transparency of dividend policy by firms. The
methodology used in this thesis can be applied to additional extensions in these research areas but also
to any other research area that uses dividend expectations or requires a proxy for dividend surprise.
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